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INTRODUCTION

As the twentieth century comes to a close, class actions are
hot. Whether reading academic journals or leafing through the
lay press, one cannot avoid seeing some reference to a threatened or actual filing of a proposed class action lawsuit. The
subjects of these suits range from the profound-against firearms, tobacco, or breast implant manufacturers, and Swiss
banks and German employers for actions taken during World
War II-to the amusing-against airlines for flight delays.' The
United States Supreme Court has begun to pay increasing atten-

1. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Jumping the Gun? Attacks on Firearms Echo Earlier
Assaults on Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at Al (describing class
action litigation against firearms industry); Michael Higgins, Thrown Out of the
Game: Disgruntled Fans File Lawsuits But Get No Court Advantage, A.B.A. J., June
1999, at 30 (reporting on a class action by persons who paid to watch a boxing
match between Mike Tyson and Evander Holyfield, in which the former bit off part
of the latter's ear); Matthew Leising, Passenger Suits Rev on Runway, NATL L.J.,
June 7, 1999, at A4 (describing class action by passengers on Northwest Airlines
flight who were kept in a plane on the tarmac for six hours); Randy Lipsitz & Richard L. Moss, Pre-2000 Y2K Class Actions Not Getting Far, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1999,
at B5 (discussing class actions involving Y2K compliance issues); Frances A.
McMorris, Milberg Weiss Lawyer Focuses On Cases for Holocaust Survivors, WALL
ST. J., May 19, 1999, at B7 (discussing claims by Holocaust survivors and their
families).
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tion to the class action device,2 and Congress has recently enacted,' or is considering,4 several pieces of legislation that would
regulate class actions. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which governs class actions, has been considered for
possible amendment.5 All of these developments, and more, have
led to a daunting growth of scholarly discussion on class actions.6
2. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999) (outlining conditions that a "limited fund" class action must meet under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B));
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (holding that a class certified
for settlement must still meet the prerequisites of FED. R. CIV. P. 23); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (addressing circumstances under
which a federal court must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment approving a class action settlement).
3. Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (placing various limits on
class actions brought after January 1, 1999, with respect to Y2K failures); Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) (creating a uniform federal law and exclusive federal jurisdiction
for certain types of securities fraud class actions); Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (regulating various aspects of securities fraud litigation, including, but not
limited to, class action suits).
4. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. (curbing a
variety of purported "abuses" of class actions by plaintiff's lawyers); Interstate Class
Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (making it easier to bring
certain types of class actions in federal court or facilitate removal of such actions
from state to federal court). See generally George F. Sanderson III, Note, Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative Proposals Past
and Present, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 315 (1999) (discussing proposed and
enacted legislation).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 171-99.
6. David Shapiro has observed:
Small wonder then, that the significance of the class action, and its
proper bounds, have become the topic du jour for academic and judicial
conferences, for a whole range of law school courses, and for legal journals. Is there a law review out there somewhere-aside perhaps from
such esoteric publications as the JAG Journal-that has managed to keep
the pages unsullied by the controversies that the class action device has
generated?
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 914-16 (1998) (footnote omitted). In what is only a selected bibliography,
he lists two books and forty-nine law review articles on class actions. See id. at 914
n.2. Contributions to the scholarly literature continue apace. See, e.g., LINDA S.
MULLENIX, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CLASS ACTION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999); Samuel
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. CT.
REV. 187; Mark C. Weber, A Content-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155 (1998) (arguing
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This attention is not particularly surprising, for a class action
is relatively anomalous even in the modern procedural developments of this century. A class action is a lawsuit brought in the
name of individual class representatives on behalf of, or against,
an entire group of individuals with common issues that make a
collective lawsuit more efficient.7 As the Eighth Circuit famously
noted five decades ago, the class action "was an invention in
equity... mothered by the practical necessity of providing a
procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large
groups of individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their
equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable
wrongs."' By allowing a case that has ramifications for a great
number of people to be resolved in a single proceeding, the class
action serves both the needs of justice and judicial economy.9
Plaintiffs, who otherwise would be denied their day in court, can
find relief through a class action. Furthermore, defendants, who
otherwise might face seemingly endless streams of litigation, can
have their complete liability established in one proceeding. The
class action is an increasingly popular and necessary tool in
today's legal system, helping to address the claims of mass tort
victims and to abrogate the injustices of civil rights violations. °
The class action, however, is not without its critics, and calls for
changes in its structure abound."

that preclusive class actions should not be settled without the consent of all class
members); Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems and Proposals: A Report to the
Mass Torts Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328 (1999).
7. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 7A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1751, at 7-8 (2d ed. 1986) (defining class actions); see id. § 1754, at 49 (noting
cost and convenience advantages of class actions).
8. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948), quoted
in 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1751, at 7. The equitable origins of the class
action are addressed further in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2308-09
(1999).
9. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1751, at 7-15 (noting the purposes for
class action lawsuits).
10. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on United States Group Actions, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 833, 834 (1997).

11. See, e.g., Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested
Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort
Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 483-95 (1988) (proposing changes to Rule 23

to allow for greater use in the resolution of mass torts).
"In 1985, a Special Committee on Class Action Improvements of the American

20001

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW UNDER RULE

23(f)

1535

At present, Rule 23 requires the trial court to certify, or ap12
prove of, the class before a case can proceed as a class action.
The rule contains various provisions that instruct the court on
which factors to consider in its determination. 13 The court's decision, which is made as early as possible in the litigation, 14 can
control the parties' litigation strategy for the balance of the case,
as a practical matter. 5 As a result, the certification orders of the
trial court often are targeted for appeal by the parties adversely
affected by them. 16 Waiting until the end of the litigation, however, before contesting the court's decision on class certification,
is often not a viable option.'7 Unhappy litigants may want to
pursue an immediate interlocutory appeal of the class certification decision.' 8
Until recently, parties seeking interlocutory relief have had
few options.' 9 Due to the restraints of the final judgment rule,
which permits appeal only at the end of the litigation, courts
have not been very receptive to attempts to appeal interlocutory
orders.2 Moreover, the exceptions to the final judgment rule
that do exist have stringent requirements that restrict their
application to a limited set of circumstances. 2 ' Thus, it has been
extremely difficult for litigants to gain an immediate appeal of a

Bar Association's Section of Litigation" presented to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee a list of recommendations for revisions to Rule 23 that included "collapsing
the three categories of class actions into one, expanding judicial discretion to modify
the notice requirements, authorizing precertification rulings on motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment, and permitting discretionary interlocutory appellate review of rulings on class certification." Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical
Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 80
(1996). None of the proposals went into effect (except, eventually, for the very last,
the subject of this Article). Still more proposals to amend Rule 23 were advanced in
the 1990s. See id. at 80-81.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For a discussion of the mechanics of Rule 23, see
infra text accompanying notes 29-60.
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth the requirements of class actions).
14. See id. 23(c)(1).
15. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION, THmD § 30.1 (1995).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra note 106 and accompanying text.
infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text
infra text accompanying notes 72-170.
infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
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class certification order. In response to these constraints, the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in
1996, proposed an amendment to Rule 23 that would provide
litigants an additional means by which to seek an interlocutory
appeal.22 The amendment, a new Rule 23(f), effective December
1, 1998, provides that:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification under this rule if application is made to it
within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the court of appeals so orders it.2
This provision has the potential to open broad new avenues of
interlocutory review of class certification decisions in the federal
courts. To date, Rule 23(f) has received little scholarly attention.24 As of the writing of the present Article, only one circuit
has rendered a published opinion discussing the application of
the rule.25 Indeed, the burgeoning literature on class actions has
devoted relatively little discussion to the role of appellate courts
2
in general and, in particular, to interlocutory review. 1 This Arti-

22. For a discussion of the legislative history of the amendment, see infra text
accompanying notes 178-99.
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
24. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1655 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999) [hereinafter
HART & WECHSLER] (discussing Rule 23(f) briefly); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL.,
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL 1399 (8th ed. 1999) (same); RICHARD
L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 385 (3d ed. 1998) (same);
JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 696 (1998) (same); Samuel Estreicher, Federal Class Actions After 30 Years,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996) (same); R. Hewitt Pate, Interlocutory Appeals, LITIGATION, Winter 1999, at 42, 44 (same); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond the Class Ac-

tion Rule: An Inventory of Statutory Possibilitiesto Improve the Federal Class Action,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186, 198 (1996) (same).
Most recently there has been some lengthier discussion of Rule 23(f). See ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION 733-40 (2000); Kenneth S. Gould, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23():
Interlocutory Appeals of Class Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 309 (1999), available in WESTLAW, JAPPR Database.
25. See Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999). This
case is discussed in further detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 307-40.

26. See Amy Schmidt Jones, Note, The Use of Mandamus to Vacate Mass Expo-
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cle aims to fill in some of the gap by addressing the appellate
courts' new power to grant a discretionary appeal of class certification decisions. Under the new rule, appellate judges now must
decide how to decide whether to hear such appeals. As the Eleventh Circuit suggested, in its discussion of the then proposed
Rule 23(f), much will "depend in large part upon how [courts
choose] to exercise the discretion granted" by the amendment.
This Article focuses on how Rule 23(f) came to be, and how United
States Courts of Appeals should exercise the discretion granted
to them in the rule.
Part I provides a brief overview of the prerequisites necessary
to certify a class under Rule 23. Part I summarizes the reasons
for the recent, heightened prominence of class action litigation,
including its use in mass tort litigation, the concerns that entrepreneurial plaintiffs will take action to further their own interest, which at times will be adverse to those of the class, and the
problems associated with concurrent or sequential class litigation in federal and state courts.
Part H addresses the availability of interlocutory review of
trial court decisions on class certification motions before the
adoption of Rule 23(f). This Part first addresses the final judgment rule and then considers exceptions to that rule. Part H
explains that class certification decisions have been held not to
be appealable final judgments, and usually have failed to meet
any exception to the final judgment rule. One recent caveat to
that generalization is the apparent receptivity of some courts of
appeals to review such decisions through the writ of mandamus.2 8 Part II explains that use of mandamus lacks sturdy jurisprudential roots and has not developed into a broadly available
sure Tort Class Certification Orders, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 232, 234-35 (1997). More
recently there has been greater attention paid to the impact of the availability, or
lack thereof, of interlocutory appeal of class certification orders. See, e.g., Burt
Neuborne, Innovation in the Interstices of the Final Judgment Rule: A Demurrer to
Professor Burbank, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1997) (discussing interlocutory appeals);
Jordon L. Kruse, Comment, Appealability of Class Certification Orders: The "Mandamus Appeal" and a Proposal to Amend Rule 23, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 704 (1997) (discussing the concept of mandamus in interlocutory appeals).
27. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 n.35 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1019 (1998).
28. See Kruse, supra note 26, at 719-34 (providing a detailed discussion of the use
and potential efficiency of the mandamus appeal).
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exception. Indeed, the adoption of Rule 23(f) may prevent the
expansion of mandamus in this regard.
Part III directly addresses Rule 23(f) by analyzing the development of the amendment in the 1990s, the intent of the
amendment's framers, and how the rule compares to preexisting
exceptions to interlocutory review. Finally, Part III proposes
several criteria that the courts of appeals should consider in
exercising their discretion under Rule 23(f). Part III concludes
by applying these criteria to two prominent class action certification cases in which interlocutory appeal was a contested issue,
and examining the first published opinion in which the court of
appeals applied Rule 23(f).
I. CLASS ACTIONS AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23
A. An Overview of Class Action Procedures
Rule 23, as it stands today, is the result of amendments in
1966 that completely overhauled the original class action rule.
The Advisory Committee, with Harvard Professor Benjamin
Kaplan as the reporter," noted several deficiencies in the original rule and sought to provide a more practical approach to
determine when a class action should be maintained and to
define the extent to which the suit could bind class members to
the results. ° The following discussion provides a brief survey of
the requisite characteristics of a Rule 23 class action.
Rule 23(a) sets forth four prerequisites for class certification.3 '
First, the class must be "so numerous that joinder of all mem-

29. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
30. Class action practice before 1966 and the rationale for the amendment to Rule
23 in that year is thoroughly covered in the advisory committee notes to the amendment. See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 71, 98-107 (1966); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7,
§§ 1751-54, at 7-58 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1999).
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The rule provides that in order to proceed as a
class action the following requirements must be satisfied:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defense of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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bers [would be] impracticable." 2 This "numerosity" requirement
focuses on the impracticability of proceeding with all members
appearing as joined parties, as opposed to being represented by
a class representative." Impracticability is not equated with
impossibility and this requirement is fulfilled if joinder would be
inconvenient or extremely difficult.'
Rule 23 requires that questions of law or fact exist that are
common to all class members.35 This "commonality" requirement
does not necessitate that class member claims be identical. 6
Instead, this element is satisfied when there are "common elements of law or fact such that the class action would be an economical way of prosecuting and defending claims." The third
prerequisite is closely related to the commonality requirement
and requires that the class representative's claims or defenses
be typical of the class in general3 8 The inquiry here focuses
solely on the representative party and not on the class as a
whole, and this prerequisite is met when a "class representative
[is] a part of the class and 'possess[es] the same interest and
suffer[s] the same injury' as the class members."39
The last prerequisite likewise focuses on the class representative and requires that the representative will "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 40 The court must
determine if the representative has common interests with the
unnamed members of the class; specifically, the representative's
interests in the case cannot be antagonistic to the interests of
the other class members. 41 Likewise, the court must find that

32. Id. 23(a)(1).

33. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1762, at 150-96 (discussing the
numerosity requirement).
34. See id. at 159.
35. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2).

36. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1763, at 196-228 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1999) (discussing the requirements of commonality).
37. Walker v. Jim Dandy Co., 638 F.2d 1330, 1336 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
39. East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1976) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)); see 7A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1764, at 232 (discussing the requirements of the
class representative).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
41. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7 § 1768, at 326-66 (noting the require-
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the representative will prosecute vigorously the interests of the
class through qualified counsel. 42 The latter factor requires the
court to examine the competence and quality of the attorney
representing the class.43
Once all four elements of 23(a) are met, the class must still fit
into one of the three enumerated categories in 23(b).' The first
category, 23(b)(1), was designed to prevent any potentially harmful consequences, to either the defendant or the absent class
members, that likely would arise in the event each individual
class member had to maintain a separate action.4 5 Two clauses

ments of the class representative).
42. See id. § 1769, at 366-74 (discussing the importance of qualified counsel).
43. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997); 7A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 7, §§ 1765-69, at 262-374.
44. Rule 23(b) reads:
(b) Class Action Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on the
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
45. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1772, at 421; see also Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39
F.R.D. 71, 100 (1966) ("The difficulties which would be likely to arise if resort were
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under 23(b)(1) address this issue more specifically. A class can
be maintained under 23(b)(1)(A) when final dispositions in individual actions could impose "incompatible standards of conduct"
upon the party opposing the class. On the other hand, a
23(b)(1)(B) class is appropriate when a judgment in an individual
adjudication would practically, though not legally, eliminate or
substantially impair the interests of absent class members.4 A
class under subdivision 23(b)(2) is appropriate when the defendant has acted, or has refused to act, on grounds applicable to
the entire class and declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.4 3
In order to proceed under this category, the relief sought must
be predominantly equitable and cannot relate primarily to money
damages.49
The final subdivision, 23(b)(3), permits a class action to proceed in those cases in which "class-action treatment is not as
clearly called for as" in 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), but is "nevertheless... convenient and desirable," and appropriate for "those
cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision."50 Subdivision 23(b)(3) is broad in nature and in its flexible association
among members. Accordingly, for a class to qualify under this

had to separate actions by or against the individual members of the class here furnish the reasons for, and the principal key to, the propriety and value of utilizing
the class-action device.").
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). In this scenario, the drafters anticipated a situation in which a defendant was ordered to take a particular action in one case and
then ordered not to do that very action in a subsequent case. Proceeding as a class
action would eliminate this risk. See Proposed Amendments, 39 F.R.D. at 100; see
also Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614 (describing the parties' requirement under Rule
23(b) to maintain an action).
47. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The most common example of this scenario is
when all members seek to recover from a "limited fund" that is insufficient to cover
all of their claims. If one class member should recover in an individual suit, it
would prevent the other members from any recovery. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
119 S. Ct. 2295, 2300 (1999); Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614; Proposed Amendments, 39 F.R.D. at 101.
48. See Amchem Prod, 521 U.S. at 614.
49. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 1775-76, at 447-516 (2d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1999). For a recent discussion of the problem of plaintiffs seeking monetary
relief in (b)(2) class actions, see Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th
Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.).
50. Aduisory Committee Notes to the Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966).
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subdivision, it must meet two additional requirements beyond
those found in 23(a). First, the questions of law or fact that are
common to the entire class must "predominate" over those that
would require individual treatment. Second, proceeding as a
class action must be "superior" to any other method of resolving
the dispute fairly and efficiently.5 1 Further, this subdivision
provides a nonexhaustive list of factors to aid a court in its determination of the predominance and superiority requirements.5 2
Because class membership in a (b)(3) class is often fairly
broad, the drafters added other provisions, found in 23(c)(2), to
protect the interests of the individual members to litigate on
their own. First, the rule imposes a procedural requirement on
the district court once the class has been certified.5 3 It instructs
the court to provide notice of the class action to the absent class
members by the "best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort."5 4 Along with this special notice provision, 23(c)(2) provides individual class members the right to opt
out of the class by giving notice to the court.5 5 If the members do
not exercise this right, they will be bound by the outcome of the
litigation.5 6
Rule 23(c)(1) instructs that the decision to certify a class
should be made "[als soon as practicable after the commence-

51. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3); Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615.
52. For an extensive discussion of the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), see Amchem
Prods., 521 U.S. at 615-17, 622-25.
53. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(c)(2).
54. Id. This language was derived from Justice Jackson's opinion in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950), and addresses the
concerns of the drafters that the individual interests of the class members to litigate
their own case should be respected. See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 71, 104-05 (1966). In a
23(b)(3) class:
[Tihe interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations may
be so strong here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether....
[T]hus, the court is required to direct notice to the members of the class
of the right of each member to be excluded from the class upon his request.
Id. Rule 23(d)(2) also provides that a court may order notice to members in a (b)(1)
or (b)(2) class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2).
55. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(A); Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 617.
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614-15.
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ment" of the case; however, it also provides that the court is not
bound by its original determination and allows the order to "be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits."5 7 Finally,
Rule 23(e) provides that class actions can be "compromised" or
settled only with the approval of the trial court.58 Class actions
certified only for settlement purposes have become a "stock device, "59 and the Supreme Court has held that those actions like
all others must satisfy the requirements of 23(a) and (b).6"
B. The Heightened Controversiesover Class Actions
As noted above, the prominence of class actions in American
civil litigation has greatly increased in the late 1990s.6 1 Although reliable statistics are difficult to come by,6 2 it appears
that parties-mainly plaintiffs-are increasingly seeking to
certify such classes. More than that, the class action device has
garnered much attention and a good bit of controversy over the
same period." We will not stop to survey those developments

57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
58. See id. 23(e). As the Supreme Court has stated, this "terse final provision" is
not elaborated upon by the advisory committee notes. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at
617. In that case, the Court had no occasion to directly address the standards that
should inform Rule 23(e). See id. at 622. For a discussion of the efforts of lower
courts to develop criteria to evaluate proposed settlements, see 7B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 1797.1, at 378-416 (2d ed. 1986 & 1999 Supp.).
59. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 618.
60. See id. at 619-22.
61. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
62. The Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
does not list specific data on the number of class action cases as such; that is, the
numbers of motions to certify class actions or the disposition of such motions by
district courts. One leading empirical study of class actions studied the filing and
disposition of such motions over a two-year period in four federal district courts. See
Willging et al., supra note 11.
Other sources of data do suggest that more class action suits are being filed.
See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., PRELIINARY RESULTS OF THE RAND STUDY OF
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 15 (1997) [hereinafter RAND STUDY] (discussing interviews
with attorneys on both the plaintiff and defense sides of class actions that showed
"with few exceptions ... class action activity had grown dramatically over the past
2-3 years"); The Federalist Soc'y, Class Action Watch (visited Mar. 28, 2000)
<http'//fed-soc.orgfclasswatchvlOl.htm> [hereinafter Class Action Watch] (showing a
considerable rise in the number of putative class actions filed in federal and state
courts from 1988 to 1998, based on a survey of attorneys).
63. Even a summary of the recent scholarly literature criticizing class actions
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extensively. Rather, we pause only to highlight some of the issues that, as developed below, are pertinent to the use of Rule
23(f).
One development is the use of class actions in mass tort cases.
Although old hat now, though still somewhat controversial, this
result was not preordained. Indeed, almost two decades after the
1966 amendment, many courts refused to certify a class of plaintiffs from a mass disaster, or in the less dramatic context of a
product used by many people in different locations over different
time periods.64 Only in the late 1980s did class certification in
such situations become more commonplace.6 5 Even now, some
courts frown upon such class actions, and their certification is by
no means routine.6

would fill many pages. For an extensive bibliography of such literature, see Shapiro,
supra note 6, at 914 n.2. For a more recent survey of commentators praising or
decrying class actions, see Weber, supra note 6, at 1159-60 nn.17-22. For an excellent survey of the history of Rule 23 and of recent developments, see Linda
Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action-With a Comparative Eye,
7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201 (1999). Considerable attention is being paid to class
actions in nonscholarly literature as well. See, e.g., MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER 16875 (1998) (criticizing judges who certify class actions that serve mainly the interests
of plaintiffs attorneys).
64. The advisory committee note to the 1966 Amendment famously warned that
"[a] 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action," and "would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits
separately tried." Advisory Committee Notes to the Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966). Some courts, reflecting these concerns, refused to certify classes in mass tort
litigation. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
65. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344-45 (1995); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing
Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Constitution and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 206-08 (1999)
(outlining the approaches taken by courts in certifying mass tort cases).
66. By the mid-1980s courts began to squarely reject the framers' intent of Rule
23 and found that mass tort cases could satisfy the rule's criteria. See, e.g., In re
A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1986). Some recent cases, however, most notably Judge Posner's opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995), have
argued that federal courts in fact have been less hospitable to the certification of
mass tort class actions. For discussion, see KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 24, at
756-836; LINDA MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION 104-228 (1997). The federal judiciary continues to study the matter. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and
the Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief Justice of the United States and to
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 187 F.R.D. 293 (1999).
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A second development, closely related to the first, is the apparently increasing frequency of class action settlements. Sometimes prospective plaintiffs and defendants negotiate settlements and present them to the court for its approval via a joint
motion to certify. 7 This highlights the crucial role counsel plays
in such discussions. In many instances, it appears, counsel seeking to represent a proposed plaintiffs' class becomes an entrepreneur, whose interests might differ from those of her nominal
client. As the lawyer's fees in such cases are awarded by the
court,68 plaintiffs' counsel often has economic incentives to settle
early-even if the settlement is significantly less than what
might be expected if counsel pursued the case more vigorously.
Noticeable examples of this problem are the settlements in
which plaintiffs' counsel receive handsome compensation, with
the class itself receiving no cash award, but only coupons or
other nonmonetary relief.69
A final development has been inteijurisdictional problems
raised by simultaneous class litigation in federal and state
courts. A state court, using its own version of Rule 23,0 may

67. Justice Ginsburg has observed that large numbers of class action cases settle.
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997). For evidence that
many such settlements are proposed simultaneously with, or shortly after, class certification, see Willging et al., supra note 11, at 143-44.
68. See generally Willging et al., supra note 11, at 153-65 (discussing the relationship between fee recovery and class action outcomes).
69. The seminal work on these issues is by John Coffee. See, e.g., Coffee, supra
note 65; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987).
For more recent discussions of this issue, see Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui
Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff,60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1997); Susan P.
Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose:
The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465
(1998). See generally MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 24, at 219; MULLENIX, supra
note 66, at 260-61.
70. For a discussion of class actions in state courts, see Linda S. Mullenix, Mass
Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755 (1995);
Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994). See generally KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 24,

at 439; TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 24, at 698-701.
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enter a judgment approving a class action settlement. A question then arises as to what extent should or must a federal
court, when faced with a later class action suit, give the earlier
state court judgment preclusive effect under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause? Under what circumstances, if at all, should the
state court decision be subject to collateral attack in federal
court? Should it matter if the federal suit is based on claims
that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts?
To what extent do, or should, litigants and their counsel shop for
a favorable forum to certify a class?7 1 Answers to these questions
will depend in part on how courts and policymakers confront the
other developments.

II. APPEALS
Because class certification is judicially determined in the early
stages of the case, it has a huge impact on the subsequent
course of the litigation.7 2 For plaintiffs, a denial can very well
signal the practical end of their claims, as it may not be economically feasible to litigate their individual claims separately.7 s
Likewise, for defendants, a grant of certification might be an
irresistible catalyst to settle the case. 74 Not surprisingly, the
71. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), the Supreme Court held that, under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1994), federal courts generally must give preclusive effect to a judgment from a
state court approving a class action settlement-even to claims within the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts-at least to the same extent as would the courts of the
rendering state. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 386-87. For discussion of Matsushita
and other issues raised in the text, see Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman,
Matsushita and Beyond. The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. Or. REV. 219; Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem
Class Settlement: Of Comity, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413 (1999).
For the latest installment in the Matsushita litigation, see Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179
F.3d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 497 (1999).
72. The Manual for Complex Litigation, Third states:
Whether a class is certified and how its membership is defined can often
have a decisive effect not only on the outcome of the litigation but also
on its management. It determines the stakes, the structure of trial and
methods of proof, the scope and timing of discovery and motion practice,
and the length and cost of the litigation.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION, THIRD, supra note 15, § 30.1, at 212.
73. A denial of class certification in this instance is commonly referred to as the
"death knell" of the case. See infra text accompanying notes 111-16.
74. This notion that defendants would rather settle large class actions than face
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party dissatisfied with the certification determination often will
want to challenge the decision immediately, leading to questions
concerning the appealability of a certification order.7 5 This Part
outlines the various rules and doctrines that govern the appeals
process in general, and then examines how each of these relate
to the appeal of class certification grants or denials.
A. Appeals in General
1. Final Judgment Rule
Section 1291 of the Judicial Code limits the jurisdiction of the
federal circuit courts to "appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts."76 A final judgment is traditionally defined to be
a decision by the district court that "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment."7 Several rationales are advanced to support this
long standing principle of American jurisprudence.78 The primary
impetus behind the final judgment rule is the promotion of judicial efficiency.7 9 Limiting appeals until there has been a final
decision on the case "prevents the debilitating effect on judicial
administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of

the risk, even if it be small, of crushing liability from an adverse judgment on the
merits is widely recognized. See, e.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d
832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.). Some opponents of the class action rule
have even described it as "a form of 'legalized blackmail' . . . due to the fact that
the sheer costs of defending against class actions create nontrivial settlement values
irrespective of the underlying merits of the claims." Estreicher, supra note 24, at 2
(quoting Milton Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 9
(1971)); see also Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Rnights:
Myth, Reality, and the 'Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979) (discussing negative and positive aspects of class action practice).
75. See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
77. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
78. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous Court in Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940), noted that "[ftinality as a condition of review is an [sic]
historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure. It was written into the first
Judiciary Act and has been departed from only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all." Id. at 324-25.
79. See id. at 325.
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what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy.""
The filing of many such appeals could cause considerable disruption to the conduct of the trial proceedings, and flood appellate
courts with additional work. Likewise, this rule discourages
parties from employing the delay tactics of filing repetitive interlocutory appeals throughout the trial that are aimed at harassing their opponents and, in some instances, trying to force them
into settlement. 81 Furthermore, a party who wants to challenge
a court's ruling may emerge from the case victorious, thus eliminating the need to appeal. Balanced against these considerations
is the error correction function of the court of appeals. Trial
judges may err in making rulings at various points in the litigation process, not simply in entering a final judgment.8 2
Strict adherence to any rule can result in an undue hardship
for particular litigants. This, in turn, pressures judges and
policymakers to fashion exceptions to the rule. This is no less
true for the final judgment rule. This Article briefly surveys
some of those exceptions.
2. Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule
The first major qualification to the final judgment rule is the
collateral order doctrine. This doctrine was expressed first in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 3 a shareholder derivative suit brought in the United States District Court of New
Jersey under diversity jurisdiction. There, the defendant sought
appeal of the district judge's refusal to enforce a New Jersey
state law that required plaintiffs holding less than five percent
of a company's total stock to post a security bond as a prerequisite to bringing a derivative action.8 4 Although the trial court's

80. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
81. See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 119 S. Ct. 1915, 1919-20 (1999); Robert
J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITt. L. REV. 717, 726-29 (1993); Martin H. Rdish, The
Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUm. L. REV. 89,
104-05 (1975).
82. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 420 & n.78 (1995).
83. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
84. See id. at 544-45.
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decision did not fall within the standard definition of "final" for
purposes of § 1291, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that
[t]his decision appears to fall in that small class which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.'
Applying this test in Cohen, the Supreme Court found that the
district court's decision was a final disposition of a claimed right
that was wholly collateral to the merits of the case and effectively
unreviewable upon a later appeal because the rights conferred
by the statute could be lost by that time. 6
Subsequently, the Court reformulated the Cohen formula into
a three-part test: The trial court's order must "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.""
The collateral order doctrine has had a tortured history. Although it was touted initially in Cohen as being derived from a
"practical rather than a technical construction" of § 1291,"' later
commentators have questioned whether the doctrine was a legitimate interpretation of the narrow statutory language.8 9 Eventually the Court settled the argument by linking the doctrine to an
interpretation of § 1291.90 At the same time, the Court has
shown fidelity to the virtues of the final judgment rule by only
rarely finding that the doctrine's criteria are met. 91
85. Id. at 546.
86. See id.
87. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). This formula has
been quoted or closely paraphrased in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, 119 S. Ct. 1915, 1920 (1999); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). The second part of the test telescopes two distinct aspects-importance and separability. Hence, the three-part test might better
be described in four parts.
88. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
89. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 81, at 125-26.
90. See Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 867.
91. The Court has taken care to emphasize that only a "'small class' of decisions
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Two statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule are relevant to the purposes of this Article. One is the Interlocutory
Appeals Act of 1958,92 codified in § 1292(b),93 that creates a procedure by which a district court may facilitate an interlocutory
appeal of an otherwise nonappealable order to a circuit court. To
be able to use this mechanism, the district judge must certify in
writing the following: (1) that the order involves a controlling
question of law, (2) that there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion on the question, and (3) that an immediate appeal would materially advance the termination of the litigation.94
The court of appeals that has jurisdiction over the appeal then
has the discretion to decide whether to hear it.
Although the provision is aimed at mitigating some of the
harshness of the final judgment rule and expediting the termination of litigation,9 5 application of § 1292(b) has been quite
limited.96 This is due in part to a general reluctance to expand

[are] excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen," Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S.
at 468, that the doctrine is a "'narrow' exception [that] should stay that way and
never be allowed to swallow the general rule," Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, and
that only "a small category of orders" satisfy the criteria, Cunningham, 119 S. Ct. at
1920. For a discussion of the Court's collateral order jurisprudence, see Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New "Serbonian Bog" and Four Proposals
for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998); Martineau, supra note 81, at 739-43.
92. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958).
93. Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however,
that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a
judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
94. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3930, at 415 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994)).
95. See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1667, at 1 (1958). The purpose of § 1292(b) was "to
expedite the ultimate termination of litigation and thereby save unnecessary expense
and delay" by allowing appeal of certain nonfinal orders. Id.
96. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
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exceptions to the final judgment rule and in part to conflicting
judicial interpretations regarding the three requirements."
Moreover, § 1292(b) is restrained severely by its dual certification requirement. The decision to certify is wholly within the
discretion of both the district and the appellate courts, respectively, and neither has historically entertained § 1292(b) applications with much enthusiasm. 9 The Supreme Court has even noted
that a court of appeals can deny such an appeal for any reason,
including a congested docket.9 9 Also contributing to the infrequent use of § 1292(b) is the narrow interpretation that some
courts have adopted of the overall statute, requiring that appeals sought under § 1292(b) should be granted only in "big,
exceptional" cases.'0 0 Courts that adhere to this interpretation
point to legislative history that suggests this statute was intended
to help the expedition of complex cases that were scheduled to
be in trial for months-although courts that reject it do so because no specific language exists in the statute that purports to
require such a limitation.' Nevertheless, the "big case" interpretation has permeated § 1292(b) case law and still continues
to have a winnowing influence.0 2
Another statutory exception is the writ of mandamus, derived
from the All Writs Act.'0 3 The case law interpreting the Act requires that it be used for interlocutory review in only the most
"extraordinary" of situations-when the district judge has clearly
Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1990).
97. See id. ("Despite the [Supreme] Coures frequent reference to section 1292(b),
commentators generally discount its effectiveness as a safety valve for interlocutory
appeals, since it has been historically utilized infrequently."). For a discussion of the
varying judicial interpretations of the § 1292(b) requirements, see id. at 1172-73; 16

WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3930, at 415-42.
98. See Solimine, supra note 96, at 1174.
99. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). Data indicate
that during the 1980s the courts of appeals accepted only about 35% of the appeals
that the district courts initially certified. See Solimine, supra note 96, at 1174.
100. Solimine, supra note 96, at 1193.
101. See id. at 1193-96 (arguing that utilizing the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation provides no support for the big case limitation).
102. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3929, at 365-69 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp.
1999).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994) ([T]he Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law").
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violated her authority, and when no alternative avenue of relief
exists.0 4 As is stated frequently, however, the writ is no substitute for an appeal.' °5
B. Appeals in Class Actions
Given the potential significance of an adverse class certification decision by a district judge, litigants have long sought to
appeal such orders immediately. Two strategies have been employed. One is to argue that the final judgment rule is satisfied
because the order is, as a practical matter in at least some cases,
a de facto final resolution of the case. The other strategy utilizes
an exception to the final judgment rule. Both avenues are discussed below.' 6
1. The Death Knell as a FinalJudgment
The seminal case regarding all of these matters is the Su07
preme Court's 1978 decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.
In this case, the plaintiffs filed a class action securities fraud
claim against Coopers & Lybrand and other defendants for misrepresentations in an annual prospectus.' The district court
originally certified the class and then, after further proceedings,
decertified the class.0 9 The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal
under § 1291 and the Eighth Circuit agreed to hear the appeal,
concluding that it had jurisdiction based on the death knell doctrine."0 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued

104. The standard source for these restrictive pronouncements is Will v. United
States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1967). For comprehensive discussions of the writ, see
Martineau, supra note 81, at 746-47; Kruse, supra note 26, at 718-21; see also 16
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 3932-3936, at 469-651.
105. See Will, 389 U.S. at 97. See generally 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7,
§ 3932.1 (discussing in detail why a writ is not a substitute for appeal).
106. For general discussions of appeals of class action decisions, see KLONOFF &
BILICH, supra note 24, at 715-51; MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 24, at 382-85; 7B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 462-89 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1999).
107. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
108. See id. at 465-66.
109. See id. at 466.
110. The Eighth Circuit looked at the amount of the plaintiffs' claims in relation to
their financial resources, along with the probable cost of litigation, and found that
the individual class members could not pursue their claims separately. See id. at
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that the death knell doctrine permitted an interlocutory appeal
of the decertification order.
This doctrine had long presented the courts of appeals with
various problems in its application. In particular, it proved extremely difficult to develop a pragmatic test to determine whether
an order denying class certification effectively ended, and hence
served as the "death knell" of the litigation."' The key components to any test applying this doctrine were the economic and
financial status of the individual plaintiffs and the size of their
individual claims. The core principle of the death knell doctrine was that if the plaintiffs had sufficient resources, or if
their claims were large enough to litigate separately, the appeal
would be denied.113 Thus, it was necessary for the trial courts to
develop a sufficient record on these issues for the appellate court
to consider." The courts, however, failed to create any precise
test when using these factors to determine when an appeal was
justified."5 Moreover, the necessity of such an extensive inquiry
at the appellate level into the nature of the plaintiffs' claims and
financial dispositions raised questions regarding the extent to
which the trial court needed to hold hearings and make findings
pertaining to these issues." 6
Cognizant of the difficulties presented by this doctrine, the
Court in Coopers & Lybrand held the death knell doctrine was
an improper interpretation of the final judgment rule."7 The
Court held that an appeal from a court's class certification denial,
based on an appellate court's perception of the impact the order
would have on an individual plaintiffs claim, would be contrary
to the legislative intent underlying the final judgment rule." 8
The Court was particularly concerned with the propriety of each

466-67 (referring to Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (8th
Cir. 1977), reu'd sub. nom Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978)).
111. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 468 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1999).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 467.
114. See id. at 468.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 468 & n.20.
117. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978).
118. See id. at 471.
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of the competing analyses that the courts of appeals that had
adopted the doctrine had been using in making their determinations." 9 The first analysis compared "the claims of the named
plaintiff with an arbitrarily selected jurisdictional amount," and
the second analysis required the court to undertake a "thorough
study of the possible impact of the class order on the fate of the
litigation." 2 ' The Court found that stating an amount-in-controversy rule was an inherently legislative, not judicial, function
and that requiring an appellate court to conduct a thorough
examination of the record to determine jurisdiction could result
in a waste of judicial resources.' 2 ' The Court reasoned that allowing appeals from nonfinal orders that turned on the facts of a
particular case would force the appellate courts into the trial
processes, thus defeating a crucial purpose of the finality requirement: "'that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective courts." 2
The Court, however, identified the "principal vice" of the
death knell doctrine to be its allowance of indiscriminate interlocutory appeals, reasoning that it was contrary to the mandate
of the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, which carefully limits
the availability of such review.12 As discussed above, the Interlocutory Appeals Act provides for immediate review of certain
nonfinal orders."U The Court noted, however, that its dual certification process, requiring both the trial and the appellate court
to permit the appeal, serves to confine this procedure to appropriate cases and to avoid "time-consuming jurisdictional determinations in the court of appeals." 12 5 The gloss of the death knell
doctrine on the final judgment rule provided plaintiffs with a
means by which they could circumvent the stringent requirements of § 1292(b), which clearly contradicted the legislative
intent of limiting interlocutory appeals.2 6
119. See id.
120. Id. at 472.
121. See id. at 472-73.
122. Id. at 476 (quoting Parkinson v. April Indus., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir.
1975)).
123. See id. at 474.
124. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
125. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-75.
126. For general discussions of Coopers & Lybrand, see 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
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2. The CollateralOrder Exception
The plaintiffs in Coopers & Lybrand also argued, in the alternative, that interlocutory review of the denial of class certification was available under the collateral order doctrine. 12' The
Court gave short shrift to this argument, however, finding that
2
none of the criteria for satisfying that doctrine had been met. 1
In three terse sentences, the Court held that a class certification
decision was not conclusive because it was subject to revision,
that class determination is enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues that compose the plaintiff's cause of action, and that a
denial of class certification was appealable after final judgment
by the plaintiff or intervening class members. 2 9
3. The § 1292(b) Exception
At first blush, § 1292(b) seems to be an ideal vehicle for interlocutory review of class certification decisions. The Coopers &
Lybrand opinion lavished praise on § 1292(b), comparing it
favorably to what it deemed to be the problematic aspects of
the death knell doctrine.'3 0 The Court noted with seeming approval several lower court opinions that heard such appeals
under § 1292(b).' 3 ' Moreover, the guided discretion embodied in

note
127.
128.
129.

7, §
See
See
See

1802, at 472-73; 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3914.19, at 58-62.
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 467-68.
id. at 468-69.
id. at 469. Although Coopers & Lybrand involved the denial of class certif-

ication, its logic extends to attempted interlocutory review of the grant of class certification as well. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 484-86 (2d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1999) (explaining that appeals from orders granting and denying class

certification follow the same general pattern).
130. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 466 & n.5 (quoting § 1292(b) and pointing out that plaintiffs did not seek certification under the provision); see id. at 47475 (arguing that § 1292(b), unlike the death knell doctrine, does not allow "indis-

criminate interlocutory review" of class certification decisions).
131. See id. at 475 n.27 ("Several Courts of Appeals have heard appeals from discretionary class determinations pursuant to § 1292(b)."). Quoting Judge Friendly, the
Court went on to say:
[Tihe best solution is to hold that appeals from the grant or denial of
class action designation can be taken only under the procedure for interlocutory appeals provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).... Since the need for
review of class action orders turns on the facts of the particular case,
this procedure is preferable to attempts to formulate standards which are
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the § 1292(b) criteria appears to be an attractive middle ground
between permitting no interlocutory appeals at all and permitting such appeals with almost unlimited discretion. 132 The Coopers & Lybrand opinion faulted the death knell doctrine in part
for going to the latter extreme. 13 The "big case" requirement,
whatever its faults, would not be a barrier to review of class
certifications. Many or most class actions, it would seem, would
satisfy that requirement.
The reality did not meet the promise. As one court forthrightly
put it, "appellate review of class certification decisions under
§ 1292(b) is and will be rare."'" At least two reasons appear to
account for the relatively minor role § 1292(b) has come to play
in interlocutory appeals of such decisions. The first problem is
the dual certification requirement. Even if a litigant is successful in convincing the district judge to certify the appeal, the
barrier of convincing the court of appeals to accept the appeal
still exists. 135 Second, class action certification decisions do not
always fit neatly into the § 1292(b) criteria. The statute requires
that there be a contestable issue of law, but many class certifica16
tion decisions turn heavily on the particular facts of the case. 3 7
The other criteria of § 1292(b) may also be difficult to meet.'

necessarily so vague as to give rise to undesirable jurisdictional litigation
with concomitant expense and delay.
Id. at 475-76 n.27 (quoting Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 660 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring).
132. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3931, at 449-50 (touting use of § 1292(b)
in class action determinations).
133. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 476.
134. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
135. See id. at 1387; Jones, supra note 26, at 239-40; Kruse, supra note 26, at 71718. The courts of appeals usually consider § 1292(b) certification requests by way of
a standing three-judge motion panel, which will not necessarily be the same panel to
hear the case on the merits if certification is accepted. See Solimine, supra note 96,
at 1200. We have only incomplete data on the disposition of such motions, because
both district courts and appellate courts rarely issue published decisions on these
matters. See id. at 1202. Very little information exists on the rate that district judges
accept certification requests. The data that exists on the rate of acceptance by courts
of appeals indicate that it runs well below 50%. See supra note 99.
136. See Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1386-87; 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802,
at 477-78 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1999).
137. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 478-79 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
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Although some significant class certification decisions have been
reviewed under § 1292(b), the consensus is that the statute has
not been used widely in that connection.188
4. The Mandamus Exception
As previously observed, the use of mandamus to obtain interlocutory review of any matter is said to be rare because the
standard to obtain the writ is putatively very difficult to satisfy. 9
The standard sources apply this learning to class certification
decisions. Thus, it often is said that mandamus review of such
decisions is rare and used only in extraordinary situations.'
Rare, perhaps, but not unheard of: Over the past two decades,
several courts of appeals have issued mandamus to review class
certification decisions immediately, usually to order decertification of an improperly certified class. 14 ' The most notorious deci1999); Jones, supra note 26, at 240.
138. Professor Wright and his colleagues cautiously observe that the use of § 1292(b)
to obtain "appellate review of the denial of a motion for class certification appears to
have growing acceptance, at least in those instances in which the issue of class
status presents a close decision." 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 479
(footnote omitted). As they acknowledge, there are many cases in which such certification was refused. See id. at 479-81 nn.50-51 (giving examples of both); 16 WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 7, § 3931, at 447-49 nn.18-19 (giving examples of both). For examples of cases in which § 1292(b) certification was granted, see Valentino v. CarterWallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (decertifying class in products liability
case); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a
class of all nicotine-dependent persons in the United States); Jenkins v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming certification of an asbestos class
action of 5000 plaintiffs in Texas). Perhaps it is not surprising that § 1292(b) apparently has been used more often in mass tort class actions. Those types of cases, as
opposed to other types of class actions, are apt to raise difficult legal and practical
issues on which district judges may welcome appellate guidance.
139. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 482 (2d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1999) ("[Als a practical matter, it appears unlikely that mandamus will be
made available for reviewing interlocutory orders denying class action status to any
significant degree."); 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3935.6, at 633; see also
Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1385-86 (stating that conditions to justify mandamus relief
"are rarely met," and mandamus issuing to direct a district court to decertify an
improperly certified class, or to direct certification after a district court has denied
certification, will be rare).
141. See, e.g., In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); In re
Temple, 851 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749
F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
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sion in this regard is Chief Judge Richard Posner's opinion in In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.'4 2 The case deserves careful review
as the opinion spends considerable time justifying the use of
mandamus as a tool of interlocutory review, and it drew a strong
dissent on that issue. 14 The nationwide class action certified by
the district judge in the case consisted of about four hundred
hemophiliacs, infected by the AIDS virus, who were suing drug
44
companies that manufactured blood solids used by plaintiffs.'
The defendants sought a writ of mandamus. 145 Judge Posner
began the opinion by acknowledging the traditionally narrow
role of mandamus, to be used in only extraordinary cases."46 The
writ can be "cabin[ed]:"
By taking seriously the two conditions.... The first is that
the challenged order not be effectively reviewable at the end
of the case-in other words, that it inflict irreparable
harm.... Second, the order must so far exceed the proper
bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered
usurpative in character, or in violation of a clear and indisputable legal right, or, at the very least, patently erroneous.147

The numbers of class certification orders that will meet both
conditions would be "small," he conceded, 48 but this case was
one of them. The first condition was met, Judge Posner concluded,
because the class certification placed intolerable burdens on the
defendants to settle. 4 9 The magnitude of financial risk' 50 was so
high that defendants would "be under intense pressure to settle," meaning that "class certification-the ruling that will have

142. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
143. See id. at 1304-08 (Rovner, J., dissenting). For a summary of the dissent, see
infra note 159.

144. See id. at 1294, 1296.
145. See id. at 1294.
146. See id. ("Otherwise, interlocutory orders would be appealable routinely, but
with 'appeal' renamed 'mandamus.'").
147. Id. at 1295 (citations omitted).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1297-98.
150. Based on the potential number of members of a plaintiff class, the court found
that the defendants "might, therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability
(conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy." Id. at 1298.
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forced them to settle-will never be reviewed."' 51 Hence, the
harm was irreparable.
For several reasons, the court also concluded that the second
condition of mandamus was met. The class certification would
force the defendants "to stake their companies on the outcome of
a single jury trial." 5 2 This scenario was problematic because at
the time of certification, the defendants had prevailed in twelve
53
of the thirteen cases that had been litigated to judgment.
Moreover, it would be impossible for a single trial to encompass
the differing aspects of tort law in the fifty states."M Finally, the
court found fault with the district judge's plan to have the initial
jury trial limited to certain issues of liability.'55 Succeeding juries
would have then decided remaining liability and all remedial
issues forindividual plaintiffs.'56 This scenario, the court believed,
would permit succeeding juries to revisit issues putatively decided
by the first jury.'57 This could work a violation of the Seventh

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 1299.
See id. at 1299-300.
See id. at 1300-02.
See id. at 1302-03.
See id. at 1303.
The plan of the district judge in this case is inconsistent with the principle that the findings of one jury are not to be reexamined by a second,
or third, or nth jury. The first jury will not determine liability. It will
determine merely whether one or more of the defendants was negligent
under one of the two theories. The first jury may go on to decide the
additional issues with regard to the named plaintiffs. But it will not
decide them with regard to the other class members. Unless the defendants settle, a second (and third, and fourth, and hundredth, and conceivably thousandth) jury will have to decide, in individual follow-on
litigation by class members not named as plaintiffs in the Wadleigh case,
such issues as comparative negligence-did any class members knowingly
continue to use unsafe blood solids after they learned or should have
learned of the risk of contamination with HIV?-and proximate causation.
Both issues overlap the issue of the defendants' negligence. Comparative
negligence entails, as the name implies, a comparison of the degree of
negligence of plaintiff and defendant. Proximate causation is found by
determining whether the harm to the plaintiff followed in some sense
naturally, uninterruptedly, and with reasonable probability from the negligent act of the defendant. It overlaps the issue of the defendants' negligence even when the state's law does not (as many states do) make the
foreseeability of the risk to which the defendant subjected the plaintiff an
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Amendment right to a jury trial and, coincidentally, the court
noted that writs of mandamus often had been used to police
violations of the Amendment. 158 In granting the writ, the court
added, seemingly contrary to the conventional wisdom, that
"most federal courts" had refused to certify class action in mass
tort cases, a good thing too as "[t]hose courts that have permitted it have been criticized, and alternatives have been suggested
which recognize that a sample of trials makes more sense than
entrusting the fate of an industry to a single jury."'59
Rhone-Poulenc has provoked considerable commentary. Some
critics wondered whether Judge Posner had expanded mandamus to the breaking point in order to quickly review and decertify
a poorly conceived class. 60 Other writers praised the decision for
explicit ingredient of negligence. A second or subsequent jury might find
that the defendants' failure to take precautions against infection with
Hepatitis B could- not be thought the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
infection with HIV, a different and unknown blood-borne virus. How the
resulting inconsistency between juries could be prevented escapes us.
Id. (citations omitted).
158. See id. at 1303-04 (referring to, inter alia, Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962)). The court
added that, when Seventh Amendment issues are involved, "strict compliance with
the stringent conditions on the availability of the writ (including the requirement of
proving irreparable harm) is excused." Id. at 1303.
159. Id. at 1304. Judge Rovner vigorously dissented. See id. at 1304-08 (Rovner, J.,
dissenting). She argued among other things that the majority's analysis logically extended to "virtually every class certification order," because "[clertification orders almost always increase the likelihood of settlement." Id. at 1305. She also took issue
with Judge Posner's "statistical conjecturing," id. at 1307, and his several references
to plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, see id. at 1308.
160. See, e.g., MULLENIX, supra note 66, at 227; Neuborne, supra note 26, at 2100;
Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 500 n.7 (1998) (citing other critical commentary).
Kruse gives a particularly careful critique of the case. Unlike much of the other
literature, Kruse reviews similar mandamus cases in other circuits, most predating
Rhone-Poulenc, see supra note 141 (listing some of those cases), and persuasively
argues that many of those cases used mandamus too liberally, see Kruse, supra note
26, at 721-27. In particular, he contends that those cases had a low threshold for
determining what was a "clearly erroneous" class certification decision, and
impermissibly used a balancing test. See Kruse, supra note 26, at 721-27. Turning to
Rhone-Poulenc, Kruse applauds Judge Posner's explicit recognition of the narrow role
of mandamus, see id. at 728, but proceeds to argue that Posner was in effect resurrecting a version of the death knell doctrine banished by Coopers & Lybrand, see id.
at 729-31 (tracking largely Judge Rovner's dissent). Kruse concludes by arguing in
favor of a more detailed version of what became Rule 23(f). See id. at 734-35.
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its realistic appraisal of class action litigation, one that enabled
appellate courts to shape class action doctrine usefully in a way
that Coopers & Lybrand prevented.16 1 It remains to be seen
whether Rhone-Poulenc portends a more aggressive use of mandamus in this regard by the court of appeals. As we explain in
the balance of the Article, we doubt that Rhone-Poulenc will
have such a generative capacity after the adoption of Rule 23(f).
C. The Status Quo of Appellate Review of Class Certification
Before Rule 23(9
Recent data indicate that fifteen to thirty percent of final
judgments embodying class action certification decisions are appealed. 6 2 This figure is similar to the appeal rate from all final

civil judgments in the federal court system.'63 A large percentage

of the class action decisions were affirmed,"
similar to the figure for other appeals.' 6 5

which again is

Our picture of interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions is much less clear. Doctrinally, as we have seen, a decision

on class certification is not an immediately appealable final
judgment.'6 6 The collateral order and § 1292(b) exceptions to the

161. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 26, at 257-65. In particular, Jones argued that
mandamus review should be restricted to those mass tort class actions with "extraordinary characteristics," in that the district judges have adopted creative innovations
which "pushed the procedural and substantive safeguards present in Rule 23 to their
outer limits and thereby enhanced the need for immediate appellate review." Id. at
246-47 (footnote omitted).
162. See WiUging et al., supra note 11, at 169 (reporting that the rate of filing an
appeal in class actions in four district courts ranged from 15% to 34%).
163. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF FEDERAL
CIVIL APPEALS 8-9 (1995) (reporting a rate of appeal of about 20%); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 113-21 (1996) (reporting

similar data).
164. See Willging et al., supra note 11, at 171 (reporting that plaintiffs filed most
of the appeals and that about 13% to 26% of those appeals were successful).
165. The affirmance rate of U.S. District Court decisions by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals typically ranges from 80% to 90% in any given time period. See Steven
Alan Childress, "Clearly Erroneous" Judicial Review over District Courts in the
Eighth CircuitAnd Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93, 135 & n.309 (1986).
166. The courts have also shut off other possible methods of interlocutory appeal of
class certification decisions that we did not consider at length above. Thus, the Supreme Court in Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978) (a
companion case to Coopers & Lybrand), held that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994) (per-
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final judgment rule have not been fruitful avenues by which to
pursue such appeals.16 Some increased use of the writ of mandamus has occurred, but it is hardly clear that it has been used
in enough instances to constitute a trend. 1 8 Even if it is, it
would seem to be limited to high-profile mass tort cases,169
though as a practical matter, as some critics charge, it may
logically extend to many types of class actions. 170 Overall, then,
interlocutory review for most class action decisions is at best
extremely difficult. The balance of this Article considers whether
Rule 23(f) will or should modify this conclusion.
III. THE NEW RULE 23(f)

A. The Development of Rule 23(f)
1. The Rulemaking Process
The opportunity for litigants to appeal immediately class
certification decisions concerned policymakers long before the
adoption of Rule 23(f). For example, in the 1980s, the American
Bar Association's Section of Litigation recommended that the
Federal Judicial Code be amended to permit immediate appeal
of class certification decisions, at the discretion of the appeals
court. 171 The recommendation rested on the adoption, as a mat-

mitting immediate appeals of district court decisions granting or denying injunctive
relief), could not be used to review class action decisions. See Gardner, 437 U.S., at
478-79. Lower courts also have generally declined to permit FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)
(allowing district court to enter a final judgment on one of several claims) to be
used to obtain immediate interlocutory appeal of class certification decisions. See 15B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3914.19, at 67-69 (2d ed. 1991).
167. See id. at 66, 71-72.
168. See supra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
169. The doctrine, known as the "big case" requirement, was established in Milbert
v. Bisons Laboratories, Inc., 260 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1958), and limits application of
§ 1292(b) to big and expensive cases that require large pretrial expenditures and
lengthy and costly trials. See Redish, supra note 81, at 111.
170. See Redish, supra note 8, at 116-20.
171. See American Bar Ass'n Sec. of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the
Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 210-11 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA Special Committee Report]. Specifically, the Report recommended
that § 1292(b) be amended to permit such appeals "with accompanying safeguards
designed to deter vexatious or delaying resort to interlocutory review." Id. at 200.
The report anticipated that "orders permitting such interlocutory review would be
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ter of policy, of the death knell rationale. The denial of a
plaintiff's request for class certification effectively may bring the
case to an end if an individual action is too costly to pursue.
Likewise, an erroneously certified class could place additional
burdens of cost and settlement pressure on the defendant.1 72 At
about the same time, the American Law Institute similarly recommended that class certification decisions be immediately
reviewable.1 73 Commentators have also advocated the allowance
of such appeals.1 74
Driven in part by these concerns and in part by more general
concerns about the complex and often confusing nature of the
final judgment rule and its exceptions, 175 Congress took action in
the 1990s to authorize the advisory committees to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure on this subject. In 1990, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to permit the promulgation of rules "to define when a ruling of a district court is final
for the purposes of appeal under [§ 1291].'17. Two years later, Congress amended § 1292 to permit the promulgation of rules "to

rare." Id. at 211.
172. See id. at 210-11. A different project of the ABA, its Commission on Mass
Torts, also recommended that given the "profound effects" of such interim orders,
interlocutory review at the discretion of the courts of appeals should be available.
See COZMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, AMERICAN BAR ASSN, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 73-74 (1989). This was seen as an appropriate balance between allowing
no such appeals on one hand, and successive interlocutory appeals on the other.
Section 1292(b) and writs of mandamus were not thought to be sufficiently "flexible"
to do the job. See id. For discussion, see Solimine, supra note 96, at 1207-08.
173. The American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project advanced this idea in
the late 1980s. See Martineau, supra note 81, at 763-64; Solimine, supra note 96, at
1206-07. The final report of that Project did not recommend a specific new provision
for interlocutory review of class certification decisions, but did laud the use of § 1292(b)
to pursue such appeals. See A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMEENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 134-35 (1994) [hereinafter A.L.I., COMPLEX LrIGATION].
174. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 163, at 344 (recommending reforms including the
notion that a "class-action certification should be immediately appealable to the court
of appeals").
175. The primary impetus was the concerns raised by the Federal Courts Study
Committee in 1990 that recommended that the problem be addressed by allowing
the creation of exceptions by rulemaking. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COmm., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 95-96 (1990). For a further discussion of this aspect of the report, see Martineau, supra note 81, at 722-24.
176. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1994)).
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provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for [in § 1292].'17
Not coincidentally, beginning in the early 1990s, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure considered
various proposals to modify the provisions of Rule 23. All of
these proposals contained a provision closely resembling the
eventual Rule 23(f). 178 A final draft of the proposals to amend
Rule 23 was published in 1996.179 Only Rule 23(f) eventually
went into effect on December 1, 1998, because the remaining
proposed amendments
to the balance of Rule 23 were withdrawn
80
or shelved.

177. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106
Stat. 4506 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994)).
For a discussion of the legislative history of these Acts, see Martineau, supra
note 81, at 724-26. Martineau concludes that the recommendation contained in the
Federal Courts Study Committee report, found in two relatively short paragraphs,
was but an "informal suggestion," and that Congress enacted the recommendation in
a "casual manner" with very little discussion. Id. at 726. It's curious, he says, that
such a potentially important change would be accompanied by so little debate. See
id.
For general discussions of the rulemaking process in the federal courts, see
Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 323 (1991); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887
(1999).
178. The numerous draft proposals are reprinted in full, together with the minutes
of the Advisory Committee and summaries of comments by outsiders, in 1 WORKING
PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMTMIEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AmNDImNTS TO
CIVIL RULE 23 (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]. For a helpful summary and
analysis, see Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996).
179. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D.
559, 559-60 (1996) (providing the text of the proposed amendments to Rule 23); id.
at 560-66 (providing the advisory committee note). The text of the proposed amendment and the part of the advisory committee note dealing with Rule 23(f) is reprinted
in full in the appendix to this Article. Given its common usage, we will persist in
using the term "advisory committee note," even though, strictly speaking, the better
term is "committee note." The latter term can be considered more appropriate because
it "speaks not only for the responsible advisory committee but also for the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which coordinates and superintends
the several bodies of federal rules." Blair v. Equifax Check Serva., Inc., 181 F.3d
832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999).
180. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Appellate Procedure, 177 F.R.D. 530 (1998) (transmitting proposed Rule
23(f) to Congress under the Rules Enabling Act only). Prior to the Court's transmit-
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Persons who commented on the proposed rule split predictably
into supporters and opponents. Supporters argued that class
certification is "the whole ballgame" and is an important issue
that deserves an immediate appeal.18 1 Other supporters contended
that § 1292(b) and mandamus have proven inadequate to provide interlocutory review,"' and that the proposed rule would be
a useful safety valve as courts began to implement the other
proposed changes to Rule 23."s Still other supporters argued
that the presence of a realistic interlocutory appeal opportunity
would encourage more careful district court decision making,
and deter the use of certification as a tool to coerce settlements

of class actions.'"
In contrast, opponents of the proposed rule argued that defen-

dants would abuse it and plaintiffs would rarely use it.'

They

also suggested that § 1292(b) and mandamus have been adequate to provide a route of interlocutory appeal." 6 The text of
the proposal, they contended, offered no guidelines for the courts

tal, the Advisory Committee had abandoned or shelved the other proposals to amend
Rule 23, in part due to issues resolved by Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997). See Silberman, supra note 63, at 207 n.28, 210. Coincidentally, at
the same time this occurred, Congress was considering legislation that would have,
among other things, enacted a provision that closely resembled Rule 23(f). See Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 3. The legislative history of the
provision is sparse and does little more than restate the proposed statutory language. See H.R. REP. No. 105-478, at 18-19 (1998). The Department of Justice opposed the provision on the basis that rulemaking was the more appropriate place to
deal with the issue, as indeed the Judicial Conference of the United States was
doing at that point with the then-proposed Rule 23(f). See id. at 25-26 (reprinting
Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the
Judiciary (Mar. 10, 1998)). The bill passed the House of Representatives, but the
Senate took no action on it in the 105th Congress.
181. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178, at 409 (summary of comments by William
T. Coleman, Jr.).
182. See id. at 411 (summary of comments by John L. McGoldrick (Bristol-Meyers
Squibb)); id. at 410 (summary of comments by Miles N. Ruthberg).
183. See id. at 409 (summary of comments by Bartlett H. McGuire).
184. See id. (summary of comments by John L. Hill, Jr.); id. at 410 (summary of
comments by Robert Dale Klein); id. at 412 (summary of comments by Richard S.
Paul).
185. See id. at 408 (summary of comments by Michael D. Donovan); id. at 407
(summary of comments by Patricia Sturdevant and Stephen Gardner).
186. See id. at 407 (summary of comments by Melvyn I. Weiss); id. at 408 (summary of comments by Richard A. Lockridge and Gerald J. Redos).
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and disregarded the views of the trial judge. 8 ' The upshot, they
concluded, would be an increase in litigation expenses and further delays in resolving class actions.'88
Some of the comments focused on the remarks in the Advisory
Committee Note that accompanied the proposed rule. The Advisory Committee Note, as eventually adopted,' 89 begins by observing that Rule 23(f) "is designed on the model of § 1292(b), relying in many ways on the jurisprudence that has developed
around § 1292(b) to reduce the potential costs of interlocutory
appeals." 90 The Advisory Committee Note then acknowledges
that the rule departs from § 1292(b) "in two significant ways."'1992'
First, there is no requirement for district court certification,
and second, it "does not include the potentially limiting requirements of § 1292(b)" that there be a controlling question of law
on which a substantial ground for a difference of opinion exists,
would advance the ultimate terand that an immediate appeal
93
mination of the litigation.
187. See id at 407 (summary of comments of Robert J. Reinstein, H. Laddie
Montague, Jr. and Melvyn I. Weiss); id. at 410 (summary of comments by Arthur R.
Miller).
188. See id. at 408 (summary of comments by Richard A. Lockridge and Michael D.
Donovan); id. at 409 (summary of comments by Stanley M. Chesley); id. at 413
(summary of comments by Joseph Goldberg).
189. As detailed in the WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178, the proposals to amend
Rule 23 as a whole went through extensive drafts and changes from 1992 to 1996.
The draft of Rule 23(f) and the portion of the advisory committee note pertaining to
it, however, underwent relatively little change. See id. at 11-12, 15-16 (1992 draft);
id. at 32, 41-42 (1994 draft); id. at 48-49, 53 (1995 draft); id. at 63, 81-83 (1996
draft).
190. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559,
565 (1996).
191. Id.
192. See id. The note, however, adds that "the district court often can assist the
parties and court of appeals by offering advice on the desirability of appeal." Id- The
note later adds:
The district court, having worked through the certification decision, often
will be able to provide cogent advice on the factors that bear on the
decision whether to permit appeal. This advice can be particularly valuable if the certification decision is tentative. Even as to a firm certification decision, a statement of reasons bearing on the probable benefits
and costs of immediate appeal can help focus the court of appeals decision, and may persuade the disappointed party that an attempt to appeal
would be fruitless.
Id. at 566.
193. Id. at 565. For a further discussion of these § 1292(b) criteria, see supra text
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The Advisory Committee Note advises that "[p]ermission to
appeal should be granted with restraint." 9 4 Although acknowledging that the class action certification decision often presents
"familiar and almost routine issues that are no more worthy of
immediate appeal than many other interlocutory rulings," 9 5 the
Advisory Committee Note justifies the "expansion of present
opportunities to appeal":
An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with
a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is
by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual
claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of
litigation. An order granting certification, on the other hand,
may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to
grant interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy
certification issues. 6
The question remains as to how the court of appeals should
exercise the discretion embodied in Rule 23(f). The Advisory
Committee Note provides that permission "may be granted or
denied on the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals
finds persuasive." 9 7 More specifically, the Advisory Committee
Note suggests that permission "is most likely to be granted"
when the class certification decision "turns on a novel or unsettled question of law" or when the decision "is likely dispositive of
the litigation." 9 ' In contrast, the Advisory Committee Note argues
that "[plermission almost always will be denied when the certification decision turns on case-specific matters of fact and district
court discretion."'9 9

accompanying notes 92-102, 130-38.
194. Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 565.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 566.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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2. Rule 23() and the Rulemaking Process
Conventional wisdom holds that plaintiffs desire class action
certification and defendants do not. This stereotype has been
battered in the recent controversies concerning class actions.0 0
Desiring to preempt a potentially large number of lawsuits at
once on favorable terms, institutional defendants may vigorously
support a class action certification.2 ° ' In contrast, some plaintiffs'
lawyers, who feel they may obtain more money via judgment 2or
02
settlement in an individual lawsuit, may oppose certification.
Class litigation, like politics, can make strange bedfellows.
A similar debunking of myths attended the adoption of Rule
23(f). Although not mentioned in the Advisory Committee Note,
surely the result in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay2 °s was an
important driving force behind the new rule. There, the plaintiffs sought immediate appeal of a district court order decertifying the class. 20 4 Although one might think the plaintiffs' bar
would applaud a rule that allows the possibility of such an immediate appeal, such is not the case. Melvyn Weiss, the prominent plaintiffs' securities litigation attorney who argued Coopers
& Lybrand on behalf of the plaintiff,20 5 opposed the adoption of
Rule 23(f) as did other lawyers associated with plaintiffs.0 6

200. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71.
201. See David Crump, What Really Happens During Class Certification?A Primer
for the First-Time Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LrIIG. 1, 8 (1990).
202. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2305 (1999) (describing a
global settlement of a class action agreed to by defendants and named plaintiffs);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599-606 (1997) (describing parties
who supported or opposed the settlement of the class action at the trial level).
203. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
204. See id.
205. See id. at 464 (listing counsel). Mr. Weiss, a named member of the New York
firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach L.L.P., is the "dean of a coterie of
class-action lawyers who sue companies for securities fraud." Karen Donovan, Squirm
Time for Milberg Weiss, NAVL L.J., Apr. 5, 1999, at Al.
206. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178, at 407 (summary of comments by
Melvyn I. Weiss); see also id. (summary of comments by Patricia Sturdevant, General Council, National Association of Consumer Advocates); id. at 408 (summary of
comments by Michael Donovan, National Association of Consumer Advocates); id. at
404 (summary of comments by Stanley M. Chesley).
Of course, not all plaintiffs' counsel oppose, now or did in the past, a more
liberal interlocutory appeals regime with respect to class certification decisions. See,
e.g., Solimine, supra note 96, at 1208 n.227 (reporting differing positions of plaintiffs'
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Many lawyers associated with companies apt to be defendants in
a class setting, on the other hand, supported the rule. 2 7" This, of
course, is a change of position from the defendants' position in
Coopers & Lybrand. To be sure, as a formal matter, defendants
might object to this characterization. Only whether plaintiffs
could seek immediate review of class certification denials was at
issue-not defendants' review of grants of class certification.
Even so, the logic supporting one sort of review is difficult to
cabin from the other, as indeed is reflected in the drafting of
Rule 23(f) itself.
Shifting perceptions of the class action device after Coopers &
Lybrand was decided in 1978 largely account for this change.
Two decades ago the conventional wisdom held true: class actions were good for plaintiffs and bad for defendants. The same
reaction applied for procedural devices that would or might
make it easier for a plaintiff to convince a district judge, or a
panel on a court of appeals, to certify a class action. Today, litigation strategy is more complex and as such easy generalizations cannot be made. 208 Moreover, the sense that appellate
attorneys on the desirability of interlocutory appeals in mass tort cases in general
and on class certification decisions in particular). Perhaps more plaintiffs' attorneys
would have supported Rule 23(f) if it were limited to appeal requests by plaintiffs,
as some argued. See, e.g., WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178, at 407 (summary of
comments of Patricia Sturdevant) (characterizing California law as only permitting
plaintiffs to appeal the denial of a class certification, at least when a death knell
can be shown). Even in its early drafts, Rule 23(f) permitted both plaintiffs and defendants to seek permission to appeal. See id. at 11 (1992 draft). It seems quite
unlikely that a one-sided Rule 23(f) would have progressed far in the rulemaking
process.
207. For example, support came from attorneys identified as being associated with,
or speaking on behalf of, such large companies as Chrysler Corp., Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Wells Fargo & Co., State Farm Insurance Co., Bank of America, and Nissan
North American. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178, at 409-13. Indeed, some
commentators were so enthusiastically in favor of the proposal that they criticized
the language in the advisory committee note suggesting that the courts of appeals
exercise "restraint" in granting permission to hear appeals under the rule. See, e.g.,
id., at 409 (summary of comments by Lewis H. Goldfarb); id. at 409-10 (summary of
comments by Sheila L. Birnbaum); id. at 410 (summary of comments by Miles N.
Ruthberg); id. at 412 (summary of comments by Brian C. Anderson).
A survey of reaction by lawyers taken shortly after Rule 23(f) went into effect
largely tracks the pre-adoption reaction reported in the text of this Article. See Robin L. Lee, Attorneys Ponder Effects of New Federal Rule Governing Class Actions, 67
U.S.L.W. 2403 (Jan. 19, 1999).
208. To illustrate, consider the dilemma of a plaintiffs' attorney who regularly liti-
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judges are less enthusiastic than district court judges in certifying classes-for example, Judge Posner's decision in RhonePoulenc-may encourage defendants to support interlocutory
appeals.
The adoption of Rule 23(f) also is reflective of a long-standing
debate over the content of exceptions to the final judgment rule.
Over two decades ago, Martin Redish argued that the doctrinal
development of such exceptions was unsatisfactory." 9 Rather
than rely on highly formalistic notions of a final decision or
judgment, he argued that the courts of appeals should undertake
to define finality in a pragmatic way.2 1 ° This would require in
each case "an assessment by an appellate court of the practical
factors weighing in favor of or against the desirability of direct
appellate review of a particular order."21 1 The then-existing exceptions to the final judgment rule, he argued, did not sufficiently
permit the flexible balancing approach he advocated.2"
In a similar vein, Robert Martineau argued that it is difficult
ex ante to label certain trial court decisions as automatically
deserving of an immediate interlocutory appeal.2 1 s He argued
that attempts to do so are apt to generate more litigation as

gates class actions. Perhaps the number of class actions that challenge the conventional wisdom (i.e., settlement classes favored by the defendant and by some, but
not all, of plaintiffs' counsels) is still relatively small. The plaintiffs' lawyers who
opposed Rule 23(f) were perhaps influenced by tactical considerations. They may
have calculated that they would gain more from enhanced settlement leverage in
cases of possibly erroneous certification, if it remained difficult to immediately appeal, as opposed to what they might gain from easier appeals of possibly erroneous
denials of certification. Of course, they could still attempt interlocutory appeals in
individual cases (e.g., Coopers & Lybrand) when it was to their advantage. Facing
an even-handed proposal like Rule 23(f), however, would require a balance of the
relevant considerations, taking into account the stream of cases likely to be encountered in the future. We are greatly indebted to Tom Rowe for his perceptive comments on this point and on many others in this Article.
209. See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
210. See Redish, supra note 81, at 92-98.
211. Id. at 91 n.14.
212. For example, Radish argued that the dual certification and "big case" requirements of § 1292(b) restricted its utility. See id. at 108-10. The use of the collateral
order doctrine was limited by its very criteria. Why should it matter, he argued, if
the order sought to be appealed was related to the merits? See id. at 112. Finally,
he argued that the criteria for mandamus, if taken seriously, should restrict its use
considerably. See id. at 113-15.
213. See Martineau, supra note 81, at 775.
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courts endeavor to determine if certain criteria are met.214 The

optimal solution, he concluded, is to invest the courts of appeals
with discretion to hear interlocutory appeals of any given order,
balancing the possibility of irreparable harm if an appeal is not
immediately heard with the danger of permitting inroads on the
final judgment rule.215
The proposals by Redish and Martineau concern the content of
legal principles, and thus are informed by the long-standing
jurisprudential debate between rules and standards. Rules are
meant to be narrow and precise, and in theory yield an answer
quickly, and rather mechanically, once applied to the facts of a
case. Standards, in contrast, are broad and vague and inevitably
require the decision maker to ponder and weigh the facts to
reach a result.216 The simplest example of a rule with regard to
214. See id. at 770-76. He specifically cites the collateral order doctrine as an exception that has generated endless additional litigation. See id. at 773-74.
215.
A court of appeals would have the discretion to refuse to hear the appeal
if it finds that irreparable harm will not occur or that some important
interest will not be served if the appeal is not heard immediately. The
discretionary appeal thus provides the relief valve in those cases in
which strict adherence to the final judgment rule would not serve the
best interests of the parties or the public, but with an individualized balancing of interests made on a case by case basis. Just as important,
jurisdiction of the appellate court is never an issue, because the court
has discretionary jurisdiction over any interlocutory order. No interlocutory
appeal will ever be dismissed as premature, and no interlocutory order
will ever be unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment because
there was an earlier appeal of right.
Id. at 777 (footnote omitted). For a similar analysis, see Howard B. Eisenberg &
Alan B. Morrison, DiscretionaryAppellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to
Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999), available in WESTLAW,
JAPPR Database.
216. For more detail on rules and standards, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 592-95 (5th ed. 1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66-69 (1992). For an extensive
bibliography on the issue, see Shapiro, supra note 6, at 945 n.89 (listing four books
and over twenty law review articles). According to Judge Posner.
A rule is a statement of the form, if X, then Y, where Y is a particular
legal outcome and X the constellation of facts that dictates it. I want to
use the word "rule" a little more narrowly, however, to describe the case
in which X is a single, mechanically or at least readily determinable fact,
and "standard" to mean a rule in which ascertaining X requires weighing
several nonquantified factors or otherwise making a judgmental, qualitative assessment. The requirement of a stake of more than $50,000 in a
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interlocutory appeals is the provision for immediate review of
decisions granting or denying requests for preliminary injunctions.2 17
The other exceptions canvassed so far are more difficult to
classify, demonstrating that at the margins rules and standards
begin to merge. The death knell doctrine was mainly a standard,
so much so that the Coopers & Lybrand Court held that it would
require legislative direction for federal courts to adopt it. 21s Likewise, § 1292(b) and mandamus are also best characterized as
standards, as they demand a focus on the particular facts of a
case. The collateral order doctrine is something of a hybrid: it is
standardlike in determining whether the criteria of the doctrine
have been met, but it yields a rule, as a certain class of orders
thereafter always becomes appealable.2 19 Finally, Rule 23(f) is a
standard. It does not provide for automatic appeals of any class
certification decision but rather allows the courts to exercise discretion, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
B. Applying Rule 23(9: Theory
1. The Limited Guidance of the Advisory Committee Note
The discretion embodied in Rule 23(f) begs the question of
how it should be exercised. Although the text of the Rule pro-

diversity case is a rule; if instead the requirement were that the stake
be "substantial," one would have a standard. Negligence is a standard,
strict liability a rule.
POSNER, supra note 163, at 368-69.
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1994).
218. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1978).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91. Probably the most controversial collateral order case was Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), which held that all
denials of motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds in civil rights cases
were immediately appealable. See id. at 530. The decision has been subject to considerable criticism. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 91, at 568-76 (questioning whether
qualified immunity is collateral to the merits); Solimine, supra note 96, at 1188
(comparing qualified immunity to other affirmative defenses that have not been
found to be collateral). Since then, the Court has somewhat narrowed the breadth of
Mitchell. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (holding that an immediate
appeal is not available if qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact).
Some commentators have argued that Mitchell should be limited or overruled by
court rule. See Anderson, supra note 91, at 611-13; Solimine, supra note 96, at 1212.
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vides no guidance, the Advisory Committee Note attempts to
provide some guidance.220 Ultimately, however, the criteria advanced in the Advisory Committee Note are relatively incomplete and unhelpful.
As explained previously, the advisory committee invoked
§ 1292(b) as a model.221 At first blush, this might seem an excellent source of guidance. Properly applied, § 1292(b) is an appropriate source of guided discretion to permit interlocutory appeals
of decisions22 in general and of class action certification orders in
particular. Unfortunately, § 1292(b) has neither lived up to its
promise nor been a robust source of interlocutory review of class
action certification decisions. 223 After touting § 1292(b) as a model,
the Advisory Committee Note hints at the problematic nature of
that model.22 ' It explains that the rule has no dual certification
requirement and observes, without elaboration, that the rule
also "does not include the potentially limiting requirements of

220. In this Part and in the balance of the Article, we, in effect, are engaging in
statutory interpretation. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120, 123 (1989) ("We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain
meaning... and generally [treat] them as ... a statute."). Finding no criteria in
the text of the Rules itself regarding the exercise of discretion, we look to its legislative history-the advisory committee note. The traditional view is that these advisory committee notes are not conclusive sources of interpretation, but are simply an
authoritative source of guidance. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); 4
WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 7, § 1029, at 124-25 (2d ed. 1987); Adrian Vermeule,
JudicialHistory, 108 Yale L.J. 1311, 1329 (1999). For an example of some relevance
to the present context, see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625
(1997) (observing that the text of Rule 23 "does not categorically exclude mass tort
cases from class certification," but the advisory committee note warns that such
cases are "ordinarily not appropriateP for class action treatment); see also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2309-10, 2312-14 (1999) (referring to the advisory
committee note frequently to determine whether, and to what extent, a "limited
fund" may satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
For an analogous discussion of how the Federal Rules of Evidence should be
interpreted, see Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failureto See the Federal
Rules of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1539 (1999).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 189-93.
222. See Solimine, supra note 96, at 1193-1205.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
224. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D.
559, 565 (1996).
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§ 1292(b)."2 25 As a result, the Advisory Committee Note itself
seems uncertain as to the ultimate utility of § 1292(b) as a model.
There is an even deeper problem with using § 1292(b) as a
model. Assume that the statute had been used more extensively
to provide interlocutory review of class action certification decisions. Indeed, perhaps § 1292(b) will be applied in a more expansive manner in this regard in the future. Although an implausible
scenario, given the presence of Rule 23(f), it cannot be rejected
because § 1292(b) was not amended simultaneous with the adoption of the rule. If that had been or will be the case, why is Rule
23(f) necessary at all? Section 1292(b) would stand ready to
provide an avenue of interlocutory appeal. Whether § 1292(b)
enjoys a narrow or expansive interpretation, the creation of Rule
23(f) suggests that the latter should be viewed as a supplement
to, rather than as a replication of, the former. Rule 23(f) properly
is construed to cover those cases that cannot be appealed under
§ 1292(b).
What criteria should be followed for Rule 23(f) to play this
role? A good starting point is found in the balance of the Advisory Committee Note.2 2 6 Recall that the drafters indicated that
"appeal-worthy" cases are those in which a denial of certification
would force a plaintiff to expend costs far greater than the prospects of a small individual recovery, or those in which the grant
of certification would pressure a defendant to settle rather than
take the risk of "potentially ruinous liability."221 In other words,
the rulemakers were endorsing the concepts of the death knell

225. Id. When Rule 23 was extensively amended in 1966, it was suggested that
§ 1292(b) appeals would be particularly appropriate and useful to initially guide district courts in their construction of the Rule. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7,
§ 3931, at 449-50 (2d ed. 1996). The same idea appears to have, in part, motivated
the more recent drafters, as extensive changes to Rule 23 were proposed 30 years
after the first wave. See Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 560. The substantive
proposed changes to Rule 23 were eventually withdrawn, but Rule 23(f) was left
intact and went into effect. See supra text accompanying notes 171-219. More recently,
it has been reported that the advisory committees of the U.S. Judicial Conference
are no longer contemplating major changes to Rule 23, and instead "the prevailing
view is to let the law develop by allowing immediate appeals of certification rulings,
which will encourage further ad hoc reforms." Mass Tort Reforms Held in Abeyance
As Committees Eye Evolving Class Law, 68 U.S.L.W. 2259, 2259 (Nov. 9, 1999).
226. See Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 565.
227. Id.
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doctrine (for plaintiffs) and the reverse death knell doctrine (for
defendants). Additionally, the Advisory Committee Note cites
§ 1292(b) to suggest that permission to appeal should be
granted when the certification decision "turns on a novel or
unsettled question of law," or when it "is likely dispositive of the
litigation."228 On the other hand, the Advisory Committee Note
counsels that permission typically should be denied when the
decision "turns on case-specific matters of fact and district court
discretion."22 9
These additional criteria are helpful, as they go beyond a
simple rote reference to § 1292(b). Ultimately, however, they are
only starting points toward an optimal application of Rule 23(f).
The criteria are stated at such a high level of generality that
they provide little guidance for specific cases. The Advisory Committee Note does endorse implicitly the death knell concept,
although it does not confront the problems raised by the Coopers
& Lybrand Court on how it should be applied.23 0 Moreover, some
of the other criteria are somewhat inconsistent. For example, the
Advisory Committee Note refers to "novel or unsettled" questions of law, a concept borrowed from the text of § 1292(b). 231 Yet
some courts have refused to find that aspect of § 1292(b) satisfied in the class action context because in many such cases a
construction of the 'law'--the criteria of Rule 23-is not, strictly
speaking, at issue.2 32 So many class action decisions are of necessity relatively fact specific, and in part for that reason are almost always reviewed by the appellate courts under an abuse of
discretion standard.23 3 Those factors, however, are the very ones
228. Id. at 566. Novel or unsettled issues "are most likely to arise, during the
early years of experience with new class-action provisions as they may be adopted
into Rule 23 or enacted by legislation." Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 565-66.
231. Id. at 566.
232. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1802, at 479-80; see also Redish, supra
note 81, at 110-11 (discussing the requirements of certification under § 1292(b) and
the difficulties faced in meeting them); Jones, supra note 26, at 240 (describing difficulties faced in getting certification under § 1292(b)).
233. On the standard of review, see McAuley v. IBM Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1046
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1019 (1999); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161
F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 1998); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374,
1388 & n.30 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1019 (1998). See generally
KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 24, at 751.
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the Advisory Committee Note suggests should undergird a grant
of permission under Rule 23(f).
Many of the commentators (most of whom were practicing
attorneys) on the proposed Rule 23(f) decried the lack of criteria
to guide the court of appeals' discretion."z At the same time, the
Advisory Committee Note urges the courts of appeals to grant
permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) "with restraint."23 5 The
framers of Rule 23(f), rightly in our view, recognized the virtues
of the final judgment rule and acknowledged that even an express exception should be rarely made.13 ' Restraint in this situation is a good thing, or else Rule 23(f) would in effect preempt
the other avenues of interlocutory appeal of class certification
decisions.237 Narrowing the availability of interlocutory review of
these decisions to one or two options is probably beneficial, given
the sometimes confusing and overlapping nature of the current
options. 8 Until that time comes, Rule 23(f) would benefit from
more explicit criteria.
In general, any allowance of interlocutory appeals must balance the benefits of the final judgment rule-recognizing piecemeal appeals are disruptive to the trial process, and may be
unnecessary given the ultimate outcome of the case-with its
costs-immediately reviewing and correcting a trial court deci239
sion could save the trial judge and litigants time and cost.

Accordingly, it would be useful to set out criteria that call for an
examination of facts and circumstances relating to the specific
litigation at hand, as well as those that relate to more general
234. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. There were numerous written comments criticizing the proposal on this point. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178,
at 407, 410, 413 (providing a summary of the comments of H. Laddie Montague, Jr.,
Melvyn I. Weiss, Arthur R. Miller, James F. Mundy, and Theodore J. Fischkin).
235. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil ProcedureAdvisory Committee
Note, 167 F.R.D. 559, 565 (1996).
236. See id. at 565-66.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 106-61.
238. Judge Posner argues that the "present system for interlocutory review is an
incredible crazy quilt." POSNER, supra note 163, at 345 (footnote omitted). He suggests that there should be a "single standard," under which interlocutory review
would be authorized "ifand only if the appellant demonstrates substantial and irreparable harm from deferring appellate review of the ruling that he seeks to challenge
to the end of the case." Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 216, at 645 (describing his
optimal interlocutory appeals regime in a similar way).
239. See POSNER, supra note 216, at 644; supra text accompanying notes 76-105.
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issues extraneous to the specific case. Next, this Article provides
an overview of those factors.2 4°
2. Relevant Factors
It is neither necessary nor desirable to formulate an exclusive
list of factors informing the courts of appeals' decisions whether
to permit, under Rule 23(f), a challenge to a class certification
order. Nevertheless, the following important matters are worth
consideration: the presence of a death knell or a reverse death
knell; the likelihood of reversal; the presence of intraclass conflicts; and the existence of simultaneous, related litigation in
other courts.
As observed above, the Advisory Committee Note, in its most
persuasive and useful passage, argues that permission to appeal
should be granted when a denial of class certification will in
effect prevent a plaintiff from litigating the action, or when a
grant of certification will force a defendant to settle.24 ' Although
the terminology was not used, the Advisory Committee Note
practically endorses both the death knell doctrine and the reverse death knell doctrine as criteria for the application of Rule
23(f). This makes good sense. If the class certification decision
truly will have a death knell effect, then there can be no better
reason to review the decision immediately. Such an approach is
not inconsistent with Coopers & Lybrand. That case did not condemn the logic of the doctrine as such; importantly, the Court
merely held that it was beyond the bounds of statutory interpretation to import the doctrine into the language of § 1291. 2
The death knell doctrine, unfortunately, had a troubled life
even before its demise in Coopers & Lybrand. The Second Cir-

240. State court systems have also grappled with these issues, and their experience
with respect to interlocutory review of class certification decisions could inform the
development of Rule 23(0. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 215, at 297301 (same); Martineau, supra note 81, at 777-87 (discussing interlocutory appeals
process in Wisconsin).
241. See Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 565.
242. Indeed, the Court, referring to the death knell doctrine, repeatedly suggested
that it involved issues of "policy" appropriate for legislative formulation. See Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470, 472, 476 (1978). Congress has in effect
responded by its legislation in 1990 and 1992 that authorized the promulgation of
Rule 23(f). See Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 565.
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cuit created the doctrine in 1966,m but while that court and
others developed the doctrine, other circuits rejected its application before 1978.21 This percolation of the doctrine did not yield
satisfactory consensus on its application. On the plaintiffs' side,
most opinions focused "on the size of the claim of the individual
plaintiff as the most important single factor." 5 Courts also
considered the resources available to the plaintiff, the possibility
of an eventual award of statutory fees, the probable costs of
litigation, and the plaintiffs determination to pursue the litigation.2' Difficult line-drawing problems attended the objective
appraisal and weighing of these factors, 247 a problem observed at
length in the Coopers & Lybrand opinion. 24' There, the Court

pointed out that lower courts had adopted two approaches to
determine the presence of a death knell. One approach "simply
compar[ed] the claims of the named plaintiffs with an arbitrarily
selected jurisdictional amount."' 9 The other approach undertook
"a thorough study of the possible impact of the class order on
the fate of the litigation."25 Neither approach was acceptable:
the first set arbitrary, legislative-like thresholds; the second
involved the courts of appeals in extensive fact-finding that
might be revisited by the district court in any event.251
On the defendants' side, the Court stated that the policies
underlying the doctrine ought to apply to defendants seeking to

243. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966).
244. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits adopted some version of the doctrine, although it was rejected in the Third and Seventh Circuits. For

citations and an excellent history of the doctrine, see 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 7, § 3912, at 451-62.
245.

15A id § 3912, at 452 (footnote omitted).

246. See 15A id. at 452-54.
247. See 15A id. at 458; Redish, supra note 81, at 97 n.57. Even within the Second
Circuit, some judges found the doctrine nearly unworkable. For example, Judge Henry
Friendly wondered whether the doctrine was "workable," and suggested that it might
be better "to formulate a rule that will avoid the necessity of making such ad hoc
judgments as have been required in these and other cases and also will afford
equality of treatment as between plaintiffs and defendants." Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring).
248. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 472-74 (1978).

249. Id. at 472 (footnote omitted).
250. Id. at 472.
251. See id. at 472-74.
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appeal a class certification order, yet they had not.252 This was
largely true. Although not mentioned by the Court,2 53 the Second
Circuit had "flirted"2 1 with the reverse death knell doctrine by
permitting a defendant to appeal a certified class order only25if
5
denial of that order could have been appealed by the plaintiff.
Even that
narrow avenue was rejected by other courts of ap25 6
peals.
Admittedly, the history of the death knell doctrine is not a
source of a great deal of optimism. Nonetheless, it would be
unfair to label the doctrine a disaster; it is better characterized
as an experiment that was not fully developed and needs greater
refinement. In the Rule 23(f) era, the courts of appeals should
consciously approach the death knell issue from a standards
approach. The attempt before Coopers & Lybrand to fashion
arbitraryrules, particularly dollar amounts, to determine whether
to invoke the doctrine, was rightly criticized.2 57 Instead, courts
should consider each appeal on its own terms to determine
whether the class certification decision is likely to create a death
knell for either plaintiff or defendant. In other words, courts
should canvass the same factors used by those courts that utilized the death knell doctrine prior to Coopers & Lybrand.253 In
addition, the party pressing the Rule 23(f) appeal should have
the burden of proof to demonstrate that the death knell is not
merely possible, but at the least is more likely than not.259
252. See id. at 476.
253. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3912, at 460 & n.62 (2d ed. 1991).
254. 15A id. at 456.
255. See 15A id. at 456-58 & n.55 (describing various Second Circuit cases). As has
been suggested, "that approached denial of any opportunity to appeal," by the defendant because presumably the test did not focus on the pressures on the defendant.
15A id. at 457 (footnote omitted). It apparently placed the defendants in the awkward position of making the plaintiffs case that there would be a death knell to the
litigation if class certification had been denied.
256. See 15A id. at 458 & n.56.
257. See 15A id. at 459.
258. See 15A id.
259. That is, the burden should be by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard used in most facets of civil litigation. Of course, higher and more difficult standards are also options, such as a "significant possibility" that a death knell will
occur. Cf Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1957-58 & n.3 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring & dissenting) (discussing this and similar formulations in the context of a
criminal case). A higher standard of proof, however, is unnecessary at this stage,
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Another factor the courts of appeals should consider pertains
to the merits of the class certification or, rather, the likelihood of
reversal of the class certification decision itself. Although this
factor played no explicit role in the death knell doctrine before
its demise in 1978, numerous commentators have arguedcorrectly-that it should be taken into account with any interlocutory appeal regime for class certification decisions.26 ° Some consideration of the merits of an appeal-in the context of deciding
whether the appeal should be heard-is of course not an aberration.2 6' The Supreme Court presumably considers this issue 26
to2
some degree when deciding whether to grant writs of certiorari.
It also makes sense to include the factor in other discretionary
review regimes, such as Rule 23(f). The less likely the order
under consideration will be reversed, the more likely the costs of
interlocutory review, such as delay at the trial court level and
wasted appellate resources, will be unnecessarily magnified.2
Certainly, the likelihood of a reversal should not be the sole
factor informing the decision to grant permission under Rule
23(f). As previously observed, class certification decisions are not
demonstrably incorrect more often than any other interlocutory
decision.2 64 Moreover, the standard of appellate review typically

given the other hurdles a Rule 23(f) petitioner must surmount. Cf Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2316 n.26 (1999) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the divergence in lower courts on the appropriate standard of proof in determining whether, in fact, a limited fund exists under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
260. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 163, at 344; George L. Priest, Procedural Versus
Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521 (1997);
Redish, supra note 81, at 100; Kruse, supra note 26, at 735.
261. See generally Kruse, supra note 26, at 735.
262. See Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court's Shrinking
Docket, LITIGATION, Spring 1998, at 25, 29 (addressing to what extent error below is
a factor in the Justices' decision to grant or deny certiorari); see also Gould, supra
note 24, at 326-27 (comparing Rule 23(f) to certiorari process).
263. See Redish, supra note 81, at 100. The burden of proof on this issue should
be a preponderance of the evidence. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. A
more difficult burden to satisfy, such as "a reasonable probability of success on the
merits"--which requires a "strong probability that he will be injured" or 'a substantial likelihood that [the plaintiff] will ultimately prevail"--typically used to determine
whether injunctive relief should issue, see 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 2948.3
(2d ed. 1995), would not be appropriate here, given that the extraordinary nature of
injunctive relief is not at issue.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 162-70.
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will be one of abuse of discretion."' Taking those points to their
logical conclusion, however, would immunize many, if not most,
interlocutory orders from immediate review."' Some have argued that frequent use of Rule 23(f) for this reason would diminish respect for district judges.6 ' Nonetheless, Article III district
judges are unlikely to worry whether their decisions, interlocutory
or final, are subject to appellate review and possible reversal.268
Whether the class certification decision is affirmed or reversed
under Rule 23(f) review, it could provide further and appropriate
guidance to the balance of the litigation, and to other courts and
litigants. Even so, a consideration of the merits is one factor,
with the possibility of reversal to be given more, but not dispositive, weight than the possibility of affirmance.
Another factor concerning the case itself could be the presence
or absence of potential conflicts between class counsel and the
class they seek to represent. As described earlier, the possibility
of such divergence of interests has attracted particular attention
recently in the scholarly literature and case law, especially in
the context of settlements.26 9 Rather than a bright-line rule to
measure the existence or scope of such a conflict, at this point, it
should be one factor informing Rule 23(f) decisions.70

265. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
266. See Solimine, supra note 96, at 1177.
267. One organization critical of the proposed Rule 23(f) commented:
It is difficult to square a proposal for more frequent appeals with the
deferential standard of review applied on appeal. There is no empirical
support for the implicit view that district courts are prone to err in certification decisions. Indeed, district courts may become less responsible if
the locus of responsibility is shifted to appellate courts. "[Plarties opposing
class certification will face irresistible client pressure to pursue appeals

whenever class certification is granted." When certification is denied,
however, there is little likely benefit from appeal because appellate
are not likely to force certification on an unwilling district court.
proposal is adopted, the "restraint7 language from the Note should
corporated in the text of the rule.
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 178, at 413 (summary of comments of
Courts Committee of the Chicago Council of Lawyers).

courts
If the
be inthe Federal

268. See Redish, supra note 81, at 107; Solimine, supra note 96, at 1178-79.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71.

270. The presence or absence of class conflicts is apt to be fact-specific, and for
that reason a bright-line rule seems particularly difficult to craft or apply. Some
factors, such as a proposed fee award that greatly exceeds any monetary relief to
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A final factor that could usefully inform the exercise of Rule

23(f) discretion would be the presence or absence of simultaneous litigation in other courts. Judges and academics alike
frequently have noted this phenomenon."' In the 1990s, there
apparently has been an increase in "forum shopping," that is,
attorneys seeking more favorable fora in which to seek class
certification.272 Potential class counsel may seek to certify competing classes that cover essentially the same persons and subject matters.273 Among the complicated problems raised by this
race for certification are ones of preclusion and full faith and
credit, especially when the classes are nationwide in scope.274
Races to the courthouse are unseemly in any circumstance, but
they are especially unsettling in cases, such as class actions,
that inevitably affect large groups of people. Interlocutory review
potentially will ameliorate some of these problems, by resolving
275
the propriety of class certification earlier and with more clarity.

the class as a whole, or diverse groupings within the class (e.g., present and future
claimants), would signal such a conflict. Of course, that factor could be revisited on
the merits if Rule 23(f) permission is granted and the appeal is fully argued on the
merits. Cf Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2319 n.31 (1999) (explaining
that the adequacy requirement is concerned with conflicts between counsel and the
class); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) ("The adequacy
inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named
parties and the class they seek to represent.").
Tom Rowe has pointed out to us that in the sort of class actions characterized
by conflicts between the named representatives and the balance of the class, there
may often be no one to pursue a Rule 23(f) appeal. Both the named parties (and
their counsel) and the defendants may be satisfied with the class, especially in the
context of a proposed settlement. If so, as is true under pre-Rule 23(f) law, see 15B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3914.19, at 66-67, members of the putative class
should be permitted to file a request to appeal under Rule 23(f). The appropriate
procedural vehicle to accomplish this would be a motion to intervene for the purposes
of pursuing such an appeal. See i&L
271. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71.
272. See Linda S. Mullenix, Dueling Class Actions, NATL L.J., Apr. 26, 1999, at
B18.
273. See id.
274. For an overview of these problems, see id. The increase of forum shopping in
class actions can at least be inferred from data that indicate that more state class
actions are being filed. See, e.g., RAND STUDY, supra note 62, at 14-15; Class Action
Watch, supra note 62, at 5.
275. One of the problems raised by dueling class actions is that of collateral attack.
After a class action has been certified in one forum, it may be attacked not on direct appeal, but collaterally by a putative class member. This can be accomplished

20001

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW UNDER RULE 23(f)

1583

Although our list is meant to be neither exhaustive nor exclusive, note that it does not include particularly unique or extraordinary decisions on class certification by trial judges. That sort
of order is more the province of mandamus review. Likewise,
this Article does not discuss those orders that fall within the
precise bounds of § 1292(b). Though there always will be some
overlap, these factors have been explicitly or implicitly excluded
from other modes of interlocutory review. This limited approach
ought to be followed in applying Rule 23(f), both to supplement,
rather than supplant, the other avenues of interlocutory review,
and to pay fidelity to the framers' intent that permission under
Rule 23(f) be exercised with restraint. If the factors thought to
be relevant to Rule 23(f) are boundless, then there is a danger
that neither goal will be realized.
An alternative vision of the scope of Rule 23(f) might suggest
that it should supplant the other forms of interlocutory review
in this context. Under this model, Rule 23(f) would occupy the
field of interlocutory review. Section 1292(b) and the writ of
mandamus would no longer be operative. 6 Such preemption
would have the happy result of simplifying the complex nature
of multiple interlocutory review options.277 It would make it unnecessary to expand the traditionally narrow scope of mandamus, as some courts have arguably, and controversially done. 78
by the putative class member filing her own suit in another forum and arguing that
the first class should not be given preclusive effect, as it would violate due process
to do so. See generally Murphy, supra note 71, at 481-91 (providing a discussion of
intersystem tension, manipulation of procedural rules, and collateral attacks). In
federal court, at least, Rule 23(f) permits immediate interlocutory review and lessens
the need for collateral attacks. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Proper
Role for CollateralAttack in Class Actions: A Reply to Allen, Miller and Morrison, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1193, 1200-01 & n.46 (1998).
276. See A.L.I., COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 173, § 307, at nn.1-4 (describing
operative bases of § 1292(b) and writs of mandamus); KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note
24, at 738 ("[It seems likely that Rule 23(f) will significantly curtail, if not eliminate, the need for mandamus review of decisions certifying-or refusing to certify-a
class. . . ."); id. at 739 ("Presumably a case that qualified under section 1292(b) will
qualify a fortiori under Rule 23(f).").
277. See POSNER, supra note 163, at 345 (describing the present system for interlocutory review as "an incredible crazy quilt").
278. See id. at 347-82 (discussing the rule and responsibilities of federal appellate
judges); see also A.L.I., COiPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 173, § 3.07, at n.3 (discussing how the historic limits on the availability of writs have been relaxed); Kruse,
supra note 26, at 739 (discussing the "unprincipled" use of the writ).
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Moreover, it seems consistent with congressional intent to authorize rulemaking to define appealable orders. If rules like Rule
23(f) can supplement existing options only, then it might accomplish little and lead to more confusion.
This alternative model is attractive, but flawed. As a formal
matter, the complete preemption model does not appear to be
consistent with the process that led to the creation of Rule 23(f).
Neither the rule-authorizing legislation, the Advisory Committee
Note, nor Rule 23(f) itself explicitly addresses the point, and, of
course, neither § 1292(b) nor the mandamus statute was concurrently amended. The rule does define the "final order" language
of § 1291 in the class action context, but § 1292(b) and the mandamus statute remain separate, unamended provisions." If,as
the Advisory Committee Note says, Rule 23(f) should be exercised with "restraint," then it suggests that complete preemption
is uncalled for. A Rule 23(f) used with restraint could still leave
some room, if only small, for § 1292(b) and the writ of mandamus to operate.
Still, these are minor points, as the complete preemption
model is largely correct. As a formal matter, the complete preemption model could be premised on the inherent discretion
found in § 1291(b) and the writ of mandamus. The courts of
appeals simply could not exercise their discretion in those instances, or use it in only rare circumstances, while exercising it,
albeit with restraint, through Rule 23(f). Even so, neither
§ 1292(b) nor the writ of mandamus are likely to be used to any
great extent. They were not expansively used prior to the adoption of Rule 23(f), nor should they be now. Nonetheless, the
other forms of interlocutory review have a limited role to play
concurrent with that of Rule 23(f).
The next consideration is the appropriate interaction between
the various modes of interlocutory review. Litigants must file

279. The legislative history does not precisely address this preemption issue. See
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: A Comment
on Martineau's "Right Problem, Wrong Solution," 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 795 (1993);
supra note 177. The Court's brief discussions of the legislation have not shed much
light on this issue, either. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 119 S. Ct.
1915, 1923 (1999); Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995). In
those cases, the Court interpreted the collateral order doctrine, which has its statutory roots in the "final order" language of § 1291.
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writs of mandamus, § 1292(b) appeals, or Rule 23(f) requests
within relatively short periods after the district court's class
certification order.2 80 In theory, nothing prevents a litigant from
filing these requests simultaneously or sequentially. Given the
differing standards of each type of interlocutory review, the
court of appeals can of course dispose of them in due course, and
rationally deny them all, or grant one while denying others. As a
practical matter, though, it may be appropriate in some circumstances to give some weight to the disposition of a related, earlier
appeal. As explored further in the next section, it may be particularly appropriate for a court of appeals considering a Rule 23(f)
application to acknowledge how the district judge may have
ruled on a § 1292(b) request.
3. Practice Under Rule 23()
The proper disposition of an application for permission to
appeal under Rule 23(f) places various, interrelated burdens on
the litigants, the courts of appeals, and district judges. First,
consider the appellate court. As we have suggested, Rule 23(f)
jurisprudentially establishes a standard, not a rule.2 8 ' Whatever
criteria are applied, Rule 23(f) should be developed on a case-bycase basis.28 2 It seems inappropriate for the court of appeals

280. The texts of § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f) state that requests must be lodged in
the court of appeals within 10 days after (1) the § 1292(b) request to the district
judge has been granted, and (2) the class certification motion has been decided,
respectively. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994); FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f).
281. See Kruse, supra note 26, at 738 (describing the discretionary system under
23(f)).
282. This seems to be contemplated by FED. R. APPF. P. 5 (Appeal by Permission).
The rule does not list any substantive criteria but merely imposes on the appellant
the duty to, inter alia, brief "the reasons why the appeal . . . be allowed . . ..
FED. R. APP. P. 5(b)(1)(D). As the advisory committee note to that amendment
states, it was intended to accommodate § 1292(b) appeals and rules promulgated
under § 1292(c) concerning interlocutory appeals. See FED. R. APP. P. 5 advisory
committee's note; see also Gould, supra note 24, at 329-31 (discussing further the
interaction between Rule 23(f) and Fed. R. App. P. 5); Warren W. Harris, The New
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure: Changes in Style and Substance, 1 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS, 415, 417-18 (1999), available in WESTLAW, JAPPR database
(providing a general discussion of Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
Although Rule 23(f) speaks of an "application" for permission to appeal, that is
the equivalent of a "petition" to appeal, the language used by FED. R. APP. P. 5, so
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itself to promulgate a circuit rule specifically listing the criteria
that will guide the exercise of discretion under Rule 23(f). That
sort of rule-like specificity, assuming its validity in some set of
circumstances if ever, is inappropriate when invoked in the early
stages of interpreting a new rule.
Precisely because the Rule 23(f) standard should be developed
on a common law basis, the courts of appeals should issue opinions when they grant or deny permission under the rule. It has
been suggested already that decisions whether to grant review
under Rule 23(f) be issued without an explanatory opinion.13 To
be sure, appellate courts typically exercise discretionary jurisdiction without giving reasons." Thus, the Supreme Court rarely
gives any extended reasons for granting or denying certiorari." 5
That analogy, however, is imperfect. Litigants, and presumably
the Supreme Court itself, have some sense of when certiorari is
likely to be granted or denied.2 86 No such guidance is found in
the text of Rule 23(f) or in the Advisory Committee Note. Even
relatively brief orders or opinions explaining the grants or denials of permission can be of use to the court itself and to litigants, and outweigh the expenditure of appellate resources necessary to generate such opinions.2 8 7

the latter should apply. See 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3951, at 275 n.4
(2d ed. 1996).
283. See Kruse, supra note 26, at 738 ("The greatest advantage of the discretionary
system [under Rule 23(f)] is that the courts of appeals may simply deny immediate
appeal without issuing an opinion, thus saving valuable judicial resources and avoiding the associated delay.").
284. See Solimine, supra note 96, at 1202.
285. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 24, at 1696-99 (discussing, inter alia, when
reasons for denial of certiorari are or should be given).
286. The Supreme Court has announced criteria that ostensibly limit and guide its
certiorari policy. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
287. Cf. Solimine, supra note 96, at 1202-03 (arguing, for similar reasons, that decisions of both district judges and the courts of appeals respecting § 1292(b) appeals
should contain reasons and be published). The practice of some courts of appeals to
dispose of some cases by one-line orders (e.g., "affrmed"), with no other reasons
given, has been the subject of critical commentary. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 163,
at 174-75 (arguing that caseload pressures and "sheer laziness" account for the practice); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157 (1998) (discussing the reasons for one-line orders and
unpublished decisions). The practice has even been addressed in the popular press.
See, e.g., William Glaberson, Caseload Forcing Two-Level System for U.S. Appeals,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, at A6; William C. Smith, Big Objections to Brief Deci-
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Consider next the responsibilities of the litigants. The exercise of discretion under Rule 23(f) often will be heavily factsensitive.8 8 Some of the facts can be set out in the briefing of
the parties on the application for permission, but that may not
be enough to develop an adequate record. Again, the experience
of the death knell doctrine provides assistance. A satisfactory
consensus on developing a record in that context was not
reached. Some courts of appeals required that a record be developed in the district court. 89 This makes sense, on one hand, as
the trial court is the natural place to develop a record and make
evidentiary findings, if necessary. On the other hand, it places
the district judge in the awkward position of developing a record
in part to determine if she should be reversed.
The Advisory Committee Note was not oblivious to the role of
the district court in developing a record. It suggests that the
district judge give a "statement of reasons bearing on the probable benefits and costs of immediate appeal."290 The Advisory

Committee's recommendation is laudable, but not entirely helpful. No obvious procedural vehicle exists for the district judge to
announce her views. The procedure under § 1292(b), touted by
the Advisory Committee Note as a model, explicitly provides

sions, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 34.
Appellate judges, fearing or enduring an avalanche of Rule 23(f) motions, may
be sorely tempted to file one-line orders on such requests, especially when they are
denied. A better way to discourage frivolous appeals is to use the sanctions process
found in FED. R. APP. P. 38.
288. See Kruse, supra note 26, at 738-40.
289. See, e.g., Ott v. Speedwriting Pub. Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975).
See generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978); 15A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 7, § 3912, at 455.
290. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559,
566 (1996). For the full quote, see supra note 192.
As previously suggested, some of the district judge's discussion (presumably
reflected in a written decision) of her decision on class certification will inform the
court of appeals' Rule 23(f) analysis. Thus, the analysis of Rule 23(a)(4) may yield
insights on the dangers of intraclass antagonisms. Likewise, the district court's analysis may address the issue of reconsidering the class certification decision in light of
later developments, an option specifically permitted under Rule 23(c)(1). Recall that
the Coopers & Lybrand Court specifically alluded to this point in holding that the
class certification decision was not conclusive and hence did not fall under the collateral order doctrine. See supra note 129. If it were likely that the district court's
order was conditional and likely to be revised, this would counsel against granting
permission under Rule 23(f).
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such an avenue by drawing the district judge into the decisionmaking process. Perhaps the Advisory Committee Note had in
mind the practice under mandamus of permitting district judges
to file a brief in the court of appeals.2 9' The sort of criteria we
suggest should guide the courts of appeals in applying Rule 23(f)
will not necessarily be inherent in the district court's decision on
the merits of the certification order, other than the adequacy of
counsel factor, which is mirrored in rule 23(a)(4). The district
court would presumably then need to issue a separate decision
or address the matter in the original order. Another option
would be for the trial judge to address the matter if she is asked
to stay the proceedings while a Rule 23(f) appeal is being pursued. The rule by its terms does not automatically impose such a
stay.
The better approach is to place the burden of developing a
record where it belongs: on the party seeking to utilize Rule
23(f). The principal focus should be in the briefing of the parties.292 Should greater detail be desired, the courts of appeals
could delegate the task of record development to a special appellate master.293 Only in the rarest of circumstances should the

291. See FED. R. App. P. 21(b)(4) ("The court of appeals may invite or order the
trial-court judge to address the petition or may invite an amicus curiae to do so.").
This has not been used with great satisfaction, given the "antipathy to the writs"
that appear "to be aimed at the trial judge personally." 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 7, § 3932.2, at 522 (2d ed. 1996). This perception can be exacerbated if the
judge appears personally. See 16 id. at 522-23.
292. Appellants also should make clear in the briefing if they seek review of issues
related to the class certification order on the basis of pendent appellate jurisdiction.
In the class action context, examples are discovery by or against the class, the content of or costs of notice to the class, and orders disqualifying class counsel. See 15B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 3914.19, at 73-77 (2d ed. 1995). The Supreme Court
has held that pendent appellate jurisdiction is permissible when the pendent issue is
"inextricably intertwined" with the appealable order, or when "review of the former
decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter." Swint v. Chambers
County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1995). For a thorough discussion, see Joan
Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction:Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Before
and After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337 (1998). Professor Steinman argues that the
promulgation of Rule 23() does not impair the ability of federal courts to develop
principles of pendent appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 1360 & n.83.
293. "The master could be a court employee (e.g., a staff attorney), a respected
member of the bar, or a district judge on senior status, who might develop expertise
if she regularly referred such matters as needed." FED. R. APP. P. 48 (amended
1994).
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matter be remanded to the district judge for further development of the record.294

294. Once the matter is fully briefed and ready for decision, two options are present. One is to have a three-judge panel rule on the motion, and if granted, then
proceed to rule on the merits of the class certification order. Briefing in the separate
stages could be sequential, or combined in one step. For an example of the latter,
see Jefferson v. Ingersoll Intl, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook,
J.) ("Thus we grant the petition for leave to appeal. Moreover, because the petition
and the response lay out the legal arguments, further briefing is unnecessary."). The
other option is to have a standing motions panel of the court of appeals decide the
Rule 23(f) request, and, if granted, have a separately assembled three-judge panel
rule on the merits. Requests under § 1292(b) usually have been ruled on under the
latter method. See supra note 135. An advantage of the former model is that the
entire process is streamlined, and judges familiar with the Rule 23(f) issues would
proceed to address the substantive class action matters, if necessary. A disadvantage
is that if the entire matter is briefed all at once, then briefing on the merits of the
appeal is wasted if the antecedent Rule 23(f) request is denied. If the briefing takes
place in two steps, in contrast, it becomes similar to the second model.
The second model is less streamlined, but can end up being less wasteful, as a
second round of briefing on the merits is made only if the motion to appeal via Rule
23(f) is granted. Another possible advantage of the second model is that it could
lessen the prospect of strategic voting. In this context, strategic voting is when a
judge on a multimember court votes to accept or deny discretionary review of a
case, when normally she would do the opposite, for the purpose of guiding the development of the law in a desired manner. One example would be a Supreme Court
justice who normally would vote to grant certiorari in a case, but votes not to, only
because she fears her colleagues would vote against her'preferred position on the
merits. See Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DuKE L.J. 511, 515-16, 53436 (1998). This sort of explicit or implicit vote trading strikes many writers as odd
or improper for judges. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999) (summarizing and
criticizing the normative arguments on this issue).
To be sure, strategic voting is rarely an issue on the courts of appeals, as most
cases are appeals as of right, randomly assigned to randomly assembled three-judge
panels. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1666-67 (1998). The problem, if it is
a problem, could arise in ruling upon discretionary interlocutory appeals, such as
Rule 23(f). One scenario might be a judge voting against a Rule 23(f) request, even
when review seems to be called for because she fears her colleagues on that panel
will rule improperly on the merits of an appeal. It is doubtful, however, that most
federal appellate judges regularly engage in strategic voting in any context. But see
Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc
Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 266-70 (1999) (arguing that empirical evidence demonstrates that desire to reverse a three-judge panel accounts, in part, for the decision to grant en bane review). Nonetheless, some consideration of the merits should
play a role in the Rule 23(f) determination. Still, it should be noted that the separate panels model considerably ameliorates the problem of strategic voting, as the
panel considering the Rule 23(f) request will not know, at that early stage, who will
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C. Applying Rule 23(f): Revisiting Coopers & Lybrand and
Rhone-Poulenc
The criteria advanced to guide the application of Rule 23(f)
are necessarily somewhat tentative and incomplete. For that
reason, it would not be particularly helpful as illustrations to
apply those criteria to a series of real or hypothetical cases.
Nonetheless, it may give the reader some sense of our approach
by applying the criteria to two cases that have dominated much
of the Article.
The first is the Supreme Court's decision in Coopers &
Lybrand. There, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court rejected
the theory of the death knell doctrine without specifically reviewing how the lower court ruled on the merits, as it were, of
the doctrine. 95 The Eighth Circuit found that the decertification
order was indeed the death knell of the litigation for the plaintiffs. The court found that the two named plaintiffs', and proposed class representatives', claims were $2650.296 In comparison
to their gross income (they were apparently married) of $26,000
and net worth of $75,000, but only $4000 in cash, the court of
appeals considered incurred legal expenses of $1200, an estimate
of an additional $15,000 of such expenses, the need to take "extensive discovery," and the prospect that the securities law aspects ofthe case would "likely require expert testimony at trial."297
In those circumstances, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had met their burden of proof to demonstrate that they could
not pursue their individual claims if the decertification order
stood. 9 8

constitute the panel to hear the case on the merits, if review is granted.
295. See supra text accompanying note 107-29.
296. See Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 1977),
rev'd sub nom. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). The claim
amount was found in the complaint. See Livesay, 550 F.2d at 1107. Presumably the
other figures were obtained from briefing on appeal. In somewhat ruleslike fashion,
the court held that the figure "falls between those cases where the individual claim
is clearly not viable and those cases where the individual claim is viable." Id. at
1109 (footnote omitted). The court implied that if the claim amount fell clearly into
one category or the other, it would not need to engage in further analysis. See id. at
1109-10.
297. Id.
298. See id. at 1110.
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If Rule 23(f) had existed at the time, permission to appeal
should have been granted. The Eighth Circuit seems to have
applied the death knell doctrine reasonably, though the court
might have benefitted from additional facts on the prdspects for
recovery or settlement, and perhaps evidence from practitioners
in that field on whether the legal services market would ignore
the case. There was no explicit discussion of the likelihood of
reversal up front, but it is worth noting that the court in fact
reversed the decertification order.29 9 There also appears to be
nothing in the case concerning the other criteria we advanced,
such as possible interclass conflicts or forum shopping. True, as
the Supreme Court emphasized, °0 the plaintiffs did not file a
request under § 1292(b), but that failure should not be dispositive of the analytically separate issue of Rule 23(f) appeals.
In Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, concluded that a writ of mandamus should issue to decertify
a certification in a mass tort case.3 0 1 He spent considerable time
discussing and ultimately accepting the defendants' reverse
death knell argument. 0 2 The strength of that particular analysis
suggests that Rule 23(f) could have been used appropriately here
as well. 0 3 With regard to the other factors, Judge Posner ad-

299. See id. at 1110-13.
300. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 466. The plaintiffs also filed a writ of
mandamus, but that was dismissed when the court of appeals took jurisdiction of
the appeal. See id. at 466 & n.6.
301. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 142-61.
303. This is not to say that the analysis is unassailable. The dissent charged that
the pressure on the defendant to settle was based on "counsel's vague statements at
oral argument," and that the "only 'evidence' supporting counsel's assertion has been
supplied by the majority's own statistical conjecturing, to which plaintiffs have had
no opportunity to respond." Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1306-07 (Rovner, J., dissenting). To the extent these characterizations are correct, the problem could have been
ameliorated by an evidentiary hearing before a special master under FED. R. APP. P.
48. Perhaps in response, Judge Posner acknowledged that the "defendants did not
mention their concern about settlement pressures until the oral argument of this
appeal." Id. at 1299. This was understandable and did not waive the issue, however,
for any such acknowledgment in their briefing "would greatly weaken them in any
settlement negotiations. We should be realistic about what is feasible to put in a
public brief." Id. To deal with this problem, defendants could be required to present
competent evidence on this point, to the court or a special master, in camera if necessary.
At least one commentator has asserted that the trial judge in Rhone-Poulenc
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dressed the merits of the class certification issue, though not in
8
a preliminary fashion as would be appropriate with Rule 23(f)."'
Numerous other cases concerning the same product were filed in
other state and federal courts, but none of them appeared to be
competing class actions as such.30 ' Nor does there appear to be
evidence of intraclass antagonisms.31 On balance, however, a
court of appeals in a case such as Rhone-Poulenc should grant
permission to appeal under Rule 23(f).
D. Applying Rule 23(f): Evaluating Blair v. Equifax Check
Services, Inc.
As of the writing of this Article, the Seventh Circuit in Blair
v. Equifax Check Services, Inc. was the first application of Rule
23(f) in a published opinion..3 " At the outset of the opinion,
Judge Easterbrook' 8 canvassed the history of the rule. He argued that it would be a "mistake" to "draw up a list" of considerations to guide the exercise of discretion under the rule, and
that "[nleither a bright-line approach nor a catalog of factors
would serve well-especially at the outset, when courts necessarily must experiment with the new class of appeals.30 9 Judge
Easterbrook then summarized these principal "reasons Rule
23(f) came into being."1 0 One is that the denial of class certification could sound the death knell for the plaintiff, given that the
representative plaintiff's claim may be too small to make the
litigation economical."' Second, the grant of class certification
can put "considerable pressure on the defendant to settle," in a
denied a § 1292(b) request, see Kruse, supra note 26, at 728, but we have been
unable to find any express reference to that point in the published opinions in the
case.
304. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299-1304.
305. See id. at 1296.
306. See id. at 1296, 1298.
307. 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
308. Chief Judge Posner and Judge Rovner made up the rest of the panel, and
silently concurred in Easterbrook's opinion. See id. at 833. Coincidentally, Posner
and Rovner were on opposite sides of the Rhone-Poulenc case, a decision that, in
part, drove the adoption of Rule 23(f). See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1293.
309. Blair, 181 F.3d at 834.
310. Id.
311. See id.
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"mirror image" of the situation facing the plaintiff in a typical
death knell.3 ' Third, an appeal "may facilitate the development
of the law," especially given that "some fundamental issues
about class actions are poorly developed."313 He added:
Law may develop through affirmances as well as through
reversals. Some questions have not received appellate treatment because they are trivial; these are poor candidates for
the use of Rule 23(f). But the more fundamental the question
and the greater the likelihood that it will escape effective
disposition at the end of the case, the more appropriate is an
appeal under Rule 23(f). More than this it is impossible to
3 14

say.

Regarding the mechanics of a Rule 23(f) proceeding, he observed that the rule expressly does not impose a stay on the
trial court proceedings while a request is pending.3 15 Those proceedings only stop if either the trial court or the court of appeals
issues a stay.3 16 "[A] stay would depend on a demonstration that
the probability of error in the class certification decision is high
enough that the costs of pressing ahead in the district court
exceed the costs of waiting."3 17 He opined that "stays will be
Rule 23(f) should
infrequent, [so] interlocutory appeals under
3 18
litigation."
of
pace
the
retard
unduly
not
Blair involved several overlapping class actions brought
-against a check verification service for alleged violations of federal law regulating debt collection practices.3 19 The district court
in Blair certified a class action, but another similar and overlapping class action against the same defendant before another
judge in the Northern District of Illinois settled on the same
day.3 20 Among other provisions, the settlement forbade any class
members from pursuing litigation, except in individual

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See
See
Id.

at 834, 835.
at 835.
id.
id.

318. Id.
319. See i& at 832.

320. See id. at 836.
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actions. 21 The defendant returned to the district judge in Blair,
who refused to decertify the class before him, in part because he
2 2 The
deemed the settlement of the other case "irrelevant."
3
defendant than sought to appeal under Rule 23(f).
The Seventh Circuit in Blair accepted the appeal, determining
that it fell within the third category previously outlined.3 2 The

court briefly noted that issues raised by the relation among
overlapping class actions in different courts "may evade review
at the end of the case," because by then, the battle will be one
among different and possibly inconsistent judgments.3

25

The

paucity of case law on point "implie[d] that this is one of the issues that has evaded appellate resolution, and the issue is im326 The court went on to
portant enough to justify review now."
3 27
order.
certification
affirm the class
The court's application of Rule 23(f), on the whole, is sound.
Much of the court's analysis is consistent with the views outlined in this Article.3 28 The court was correct to treat Rule 23(f)
as a standard, thus eschewing the need to create from a blank
slate narrowly defined categories.329 In effect, the court endorsed
a common lawlike, case-by-case approach to developing standards under the rule, a model we endorsed ourselves.3 0 As an
initial guide to developing those standards, the court gleaned
three principal rationales from the Advisory Committee Note.
The first two-the death knell for plaintiffs and the reverse
death knell for defendants-are well documented in the literature, discussed in the Advisory Committee Note, and admirably
summarized by the court. 31
The third criterion is more troublesome. The court argued
that the need to develop the jurisprudence of class actions was a

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See id.
Id.
For a fuller exposition of the facts, see id. at 835-37.
See id. at 837-38.
Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 838.
See id. at 838-39.
See supra text accompanying notes 220-94.
See Blair, 181 F.3d at 834-35.
See supra text accompanying notes 220-94.
See Blair, 181 F.3d at 834-35.
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reason to allow an early appeal. 3 2 Due to the final judgment
rule, many aspects of Rule 23 litigation may often end up evading appellate review. 3 3 Even in those cases that reach a final
appealable judgment, through a resolution of the merits, a courtapproved settlement, or otherwise, may end up being resolved on
appeal largely on matters unrelated to the application of Rule
23.3' Even when orders are affirmed, there is virtue to providing appellate guidance on issues, particularly to those that often
escape review from final judgments.33 5 The standard as stated
-developing the law-is too broad and vague to do much good.
The court correctly found that the problem of simultaneous class
action in different courts, or before different judges in the same
court, fell under that criterion."
Using development of the law as a criterion might work in
another, limited way. The Advisory Committee Note does suggest that review of a "novel or unsettled question of law" regarding class actions is appropriate. 37 That language was drafted at a
time when proposals were being advanced to amend extensively
the balance of Rule 23.338 Those proposals, however, were not
promulgated. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee Note language should be read with caution. Nonetheless, as observed at

332. See id. at 835.
333. See Willging et al., supra note 11, at 174.
334. See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that a plaintiff who is denied class certification, but nonetheless proceeds to litigate
and loses on the merits, has little or no incentive to appeal the denial of class certification at that point); Willging et al., supra note 11, at 174 (suggesting that data
showing low rate of appeals from class certification decisions may reflect that "most
class action appeals, given that they were nearly always filed after a final judgment,
may have excluded certification issues because other issues-such as the merits of
the claims-may have superseded the need or feasibility of revisiting the certification
issue").
335. See Blair, 181 F.3d at 837-38; Solimine, supra note 96, at 1181-83 (advancing
similar reasons to justify more expansive interpretation and use of § 1292(b)).
336. See Blair, 181 F.3d at 834-35, 838; supra notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
In a post-Blair decision, Judge Easterbrook found that the third criterion was met
when the issue of class certification, namely whether and to what extent monetary
relief can be sought in a Rule 23(b)(2) class, had been addressed in divergent ways
by "a welter of district court decisions." Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d
894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999).
337. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 177 ind accompanying text.
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the outset of this Article, Congress recently has passed several
pieces of legislation that regulate class actions in discrete subject areas (e.g., securities law and Y2K issues)."3 9 Unsettled class
issues under that legislation, or future legislation or amendments to Rule 23, would be appropriate for Rule 23(f) review,
especially if one or more of the other factors we outlined are
present.
Although the Blair court correctly accepted and analyzed the
Rule 23(f) appeal, future courts will benefit from a finer delineation of the factors that should be taken into account in exercising Rule 23(f) discretion. Likewise, it should be noted that Blair
found it unnecessary to address some vexing problems, such
as applying the death knell doctrine or determining the relationship between the rule and the other forms of interlocutory
review.34 Future cases, no doubt, will need to confront those
issues.
CONCLUSION

The certification of class actions raises important and complicated issues of law and policy for trial and appellate judges. The
issues are often of sufficient import and difficulty that immediate appellate review of these interlocutory orders is justifiable.
The interlocutory appeal regime regarding these orders is hardly
a model of clarity. At first blush, adding yet another avenue of
interlocutory appeal may seem only to cloud the picture further.
Nonetheless, Rule 23(f), properly understood and applied, holds
the promise to usefully supplement other avenues of interlocutory review of class certification orders, and advance the interests of judges and litigants alike.

339. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
340. See Blair, 181 F.3d at 834-39.
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. APPENDIX

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
Rule 23. Class Actions

(B) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the practical ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification:
(Aa) the interest ef members of the elass in indivdually
ceofniring the pr.....tien ar dcfcnsc e1 class members' interests
in maintaining or defending separate actions;
(R_) the extent, en nature, and maturity of any related
.nt..vr.y
erady o.mn....d by or
•c...g the
litigation
ega'ee involving class members efthe elas;
(GD) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D_) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class actionand
* New material is underlined. Superseded material is struck out.
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(F) whether the probable relief to individual class members
justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation; or
(4) the parties to a settlement request certification under
subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even thouah the
requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes
of trial.
(C) DETERMINATION BY ORDER WHETHER CLASS ACTION TO
BE MAINTAINED; NOTICE; JUDGMENT; ACTIONS CONDUCTED
PARTIALLY AS CLASS ACTIONS.
(1)

a -seen as When practicable after the commencement of

an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.

(E) DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be

dismissed or compromised without hearing and the approval of
the court, end after notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise sha! be has been given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
(F) APPEALS. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit
an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying
class action certification under this rule if application is made to
it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or
the court of appeals so orders.
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COMMITTEE NOTE

Subdivision (f. This permissive interlocutory appeal provision
is adopted under the power conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).
Appeal from an order granting or denying class certification is
permitted in the sole discretion of the court of appeals. No other
type of Rule 23 order is covered by this provision. It is designed
on the model of § 1292(b), relying in many ways on the jurisprudence that has developed around § 1292(b) to reduce the potential costs of interlocutory appeals. At the same time, subdivision
(f) departs from § 1292(b) in two significant ways. It does not
require that the district court certify the certification ruling for
appeal, although the district court often can assist the parties
and court of appeals by offering advice on the desirability of
appeal. And it does not include the potentially limiting requirements of § 1292(b) that the district court order "involve[] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation."
Permission to appeal should be granted with restraint. The
Federal Judicial Center study supports the view that many suits
with class action allegations present familiar and almost routine
issues that are no more worthy of immediate appeal than many
other interlocutory rulings. Yet several concerns justify expansion of present opportunities to appeal. An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which the
only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone,
is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting
certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle
rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run
the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be
met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show
appeal-worthy certification issues.
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The expansion of appeal opportunities effected by subdivision
(f) is modest. Court of appeals discretion is as broad as under
§ 1292(b). Permission to appeal may be granted or denied on the
basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive. Permission is most likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled question of law, or
when, as a practical matter, the decision on certification is likely
dispositive of the litigation. Such questions are most likely to
arise during the early years of experience with new class-action
provisions as they may be adopted into Rule 23 or enacted by
legislation. Permission almost always will be denied when the
certification decision turns on case-specific matters of fact and
district court discretion.
The district court, having worked through the certification
decision, often will be able to provide cogent advice on the factors that bear on the decision whether to permit appeal. This
advice can be particularly valuable if the certification decision is
tentative. Even as to a firm certification decision, a statement of
reasons bearing on the probable benefits and costs of immediate
appeal can help focus the court of appeals decision, and may
persuade the disappointed party that an attempt to appeal
would be fruitless.
The 10-day period for seeking permission to appeal is designed to reduce the risk that attempted appeals will disrupt
continuing proceedings. It is expected that the courts of appeals
will act quickly in making the preliminary determination whether
to permit appeal. Permission to appeal does not stay trial court
proceedings. A stay should be sought first from the trial court. If
the trial court refuses a stay, its action and any explanation of
its views should weigh heavily with the court of appeals.
Appellate Rule 5 has been modified to establish the procedure
for petitioning for leave to appeal under subdivision (f).

